



European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions

**Inter-cultural and inter-religious Policies  
in Breda, the Netherlands**



Second version, comments incorporated from Ria Bolink (Breda), Marjolein van Dijk (Eurofound), Marcel Maussen and Rinus Penninx (IMES).

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## Foreword

This report is part of the Eurofound project "Cities for Local Integration Policy" (CLIP), which started in 2006. Breda is one of the 34 European cities that cooperate in exchanging information on their Integration Policies and in this case inter-cultural and inter-religious policies.

The project aims at collecting and analysing innovative policies and their successful implementation at the local level, supporting the exchange of experience between cities and encouraging a learning process within the network of cities, addressing the role of social partners, NGO's, companies and voluntary associations in supporting successful integration policies, providing objective assessment of current practice and initiatives and discussing their transferability, communicating good practices to other cities in Europe and developing guidelines to help cities to cope more effectively with the challenge of integrating migrants, supporting the further development of a European integration policy by communicating the policy relevant experiences and outputs of the network to: European organisations of cities and local regional authorities, the European and national organisations of social partners, the Council of Europe and the various institutions of the European Union.

The CLIP network is also cooperation between cities and research institutes. Six research institutes in Bamberg, Amsterdam, Vienna, Turin, Wroclaw and Swansea are taking care of the publications of the CLIP project. The researchers of the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) of the University of Amsterdam are responsible for this report on Breda. Together with the contact person of the municipal of Breda Ria Bolink who is responsible for the Diversity Policy in Breda, an enormous effort has been undertaken to find all necessary data on Breda for this report. Officials and other parties who are involved with integration policies and support of immigrants have been interviewed, as the list at the end of the report shows. For instance Safety Director of the municipal Breda and the director of SCW Jongerenwerk, one of the two big social work institutions in Breda that cooperate with the municipal. Secondly the representatives of the *Arrahman Mosque*, the Moroccan *Islamitische Stichting*, the *Werkgroep Marokkanen*, and the Turkish '*Stichting Islamitische Centrum Breda*' have been willing to provide us with information. Thirdly three members of the *Bouwgroep* have been interviewed, this is a group that takes part in the cities process to write a policy paper on Diversity. Fourthly the director of the board of the *Nederlands Moslim Omroep* (NMO Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Organisation) was willing to talk to us. And finally researchers from the University of Amsterdam have provided us with data and useful comments. I want to thank all those who have cooperated in giving information and particularly Ria Bolink for coordinating the search of data. The author is completely responsible for the content of this report and the copyright of the report remains with Eurofound.

Anja van Heelsum

14 August 2009, Amsterdam

## 1 Introduction

This module of the CLIP project focuses on 'intercultural and interreligious dialogue': on the one hand the policies that the city of Breda has introduced on this subject, and on the other hand the way in which the immigrants that are involved think about their needs regarding this subject. As Heckman explains in his introduction paper for this CLIP module, the topic of this module

"has to do with phenomena of urban life that are related to the multi-national, multi-ethnic and multi-religious structures of urban populations which challenge the ability of municipalities to establish or keep peaceful relations among the different segments of the population. In present day political discourse, relations between different ethnic and religious groups, immigrants and natives are predominantly discussed in terms of "intercultural dialogue" and/or "inter-religious dialogue". We will conceptualize these phenomena as cases of inter-group relations. This conceptualization stands for an abstraction working with the assumption that there are similarities in the relations between quite different "groups" (Heckman 2008: 3).

This understanding has been established in the field of inter-group relations research in social psychology and sociology. The approach focuses on interactions and relations, and stresses that general explanations and practical recommendations can be made for the relations between different groups.

"...intergroup relations refer to states of friendship or hostility, cooperation or competition, dominance or subordination, alliance or enmity, peace or war between two or more groups and their members" (Sherif and Sherif 1969, 222). "Intergroup behaviour refers to the actions of individuals belonging to one group when they interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members in terms of their group membership..." (ibid, 223).

As Heckman states, from a political and practical point of view two dimensions of intergroup relations are of particular interest for local governments: conflict between groups and policies to avoid or solve conflict between groups, i.e. conditions of social cohesion in a city.

"The concept of "group" on which intergroup relations research is based is rather broad. In the CLIP project it includes the city administration, the city council, political parties, churches, labour unions, welfare organizations foundations, local media and anti - immigrant movements among others in the majority society. On the part of the minorities it includes religious groups and national minorities. Among the religious groups Muslim communities find particular attention. Where Muslims are not the most relevant group another faith - based community is of interest in our research. It is noteworthy that most of the religious groups are organized on an ethnic basis." Heckman (2008: 4)

Led by this conceptualization of intergroup, a questionnaire has been developed, with three parts: A) local intercultural policies in general, B) local policies towards Muslim communities and C) intergroup relations and radicalisation. This questionnaire has been send to the contact person for Breda. After receiving the answers in the questionnaire, we contacted the city representative again and arranged a city visit. Interviews took place with officials of the administration and with representatives of immigrants' associations and projects. We also arranged interviews with researchers. In section 8 the full list of interviewees is shown. The combination of the answers in the questionnaire and the information from the interviews was used to write

this report. The report is set up more or less in a similar way for all cities, though we have added section 4.2 'Immigrant and religious associations and the policies towards them'. In 4.3 we will define intercultural and inter religious dialogue as cooperation on the organisational level, either formal or informal. In 4.4 we will look at attitudes in the population, under the heading relations between ethnic groups in the city.

During the city visit in May 2009 Breda was in a transition towards a new policy. The new element of the policy was particularly that immigrants are involved in the writing and realisations of the policy through a bottom up approach. The policy paper is ready and will soon get to the council. The process of coming to the new policy paper is ready is interesting for this CLIP module, since it's a typical example of intercultural dialogue. The process will be described in section 4.1.

Chapter 5 deals with Muslims. Though Moroccans are the largest non-Dutch group in Breda with 2.9% of the population, there is no attention in any of the policy documents for their religion. Breda stresses the principle of equality of all Dutch and non-Dutch groups and organisations, and keeps religion completely outside any its documents. In the new policy paper interreligious dialogue is not mentioned either, though it was present in earlier documents. The organisations of Muslims get support, just as other associations would get support for social activities.

Chapter 6 deals with the radicalisation issue. Breda is consciously avoiding the term radicalisation, and avoiding the discussion on national level on Muslim radicalisation since the murder on Theo van Gogh. Right wing extremist youngsters are found around Breda, but this is not considered something to worry about because paying attention to it, would only increase the problem.

## 2 Background information on the country

### 2.1 History of migration and composition of the migrant populations

The Netherlands was an immigration country in the 17th and 18th century, it was at that time a centre of trade and shipping and tolerant to religious refugees. The percentage of immigrants, that was around 10%, diminished to a very low level in the first half of the 20th century (Lucassen & Penninx, 2002). After the Second World War emigration was dominant, new farmlands were discovered in the United States, Canada and Australia. As table 1 shows, a negative trend (more emigration) in the fifties turned into a positive trend (more immigration) in the sixties.

**Table 1 The Netherlands: estimates of the net number of migrants, by five-year intervals, 1950 to 2000 (in thousands)**

Country	1950– 1955	1955– 1960	1960– 1965	1965– 1970	1970– 1975	1975– 1980	1980– 1985	1985– 1990	1990– 1995	1995– 2000
Netherlands	–123	–31	36	55	152	168	55	151	190	161

Source: MPI, calculated from United Nations Population Division (2001) *World Population Prospects: the 2000 Revision*. (POP/DB/WPP/Rev) 2000/1/F10.

The few immigrants that arrived in the period 1945–1960 came from the former colonies Surinam and Indonesia: Surinamese elite send their children to study and Indonesians with one Dutch parent could remain Dutch after the independence in 1949 and the Indonesian army officials from the Moluccan islands that had fought in the Dutch army in Indonesia had to be resettled in the Netherlands because they were not safe in Indonesia. Around 1960 the immigration became more numerous. The first large influx was a result of the regulations around the independence of Surinam (in 1975). While the independence was meant to stop immigration, citizens of this former colony had the right to choose between Surinamese and Dutch nationality for five years and half of the inhabitants of Surinam decided to move to the Netherlands. A second large flow of immigrants was caused by the booming economy and the need for cheap labour from the sixties onwards. Factory and shipyard owners, first in Southern Europe, later in Turkey and Morocco, recruited so-called guest workers. After a period that this looked temporary, their immigration became permanent and wives and children also arrived. During the period that the European Union was further institutionalised, neighbouring countries, in particular Germany, also added to the number of immigrants. In the eighties the economy went down and the first measures were taken to stop immigration. A considerable refugee population was growing in that period, at first from the then communist countries but in the last decades mainly from third world war areas in the world: Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Somalia and other countries. Since 2000 the number of Chinese and Polish immigrants is increasing considerably. The number of Poles is growing fast from 2007 onwards.

The percentage of people with a foreign nationality is stably around 4.3% since 1997. The number of naturalisations has been going up from 12,800 in 1990 to 82,700 in 1996 and down to 45 300 in 2002 according to the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics.

Table 2 shows the largest ethnic groups on January 1st 2009 in three categories that are often distinguished in Dutch statistics, namely immigrants from Western countries, from non-Western countries and from refugee countries. On January 1st the total Dutch population was 16,405,399 of which 13,189,983 (80%) were considered as autochthonous Dutch (note that anybody with one or two parents born abroad is not considered autochthonous).

**Table 2 Largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands in three policy categories, total, first and second generation per 1-1-2009**


	<i>Total 2008</i>	<i>Total 2009</i>	<i>1st Generation immigrants 2009</i>	<i>2nd Generation immigrants 2009</i>
<b>Total</b>	16 405 399	16 486 587	1 664 500	1 625 171
Dutch	13 189 983	13 196 916		
<b>European Countries</b>				
Belgium	112 333	112 529	37 017	75 512
Germany	379 610	379 518	104 383	275 135
United Kingdom	76 090	77 733	43 572	34 161
Former Yugoslavia	77 115	77 995	52 648	25 347
Poland	58 853	69 115	50 802	18 313
Former Soviet Union	49 530	52 563	39 431	13 132
<b>Non Western Countries</b>				
Indonesia	387 124	384 553	121 423	263 130
Turkey	372 714	378 400	195 520	182 880
Surinam	335 799	338 519	185 001	153 518
Morocco	335 127	341 640	166 877	174 763
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba	131 841	134 486	79 629	54 857
China	47 108	50 681	35 291	15 390
<b>Refugees</b>				
Iraq	45 459	49 234	38 693	10 541
Afghanistan	37 370	37 739	30 737	7 002
Iran	29 771	30 617	24 535	6 082
Somalia	19 549	21 753	15 224	6 529

Source: Statline (Central Bureau for Statistics) on 16 April 2009

As table 2 shows, the older immigrant groups consist already of a large second generation. Within these groups the male/female ratio is around 50%. The refugee populations consist for a larger degree of men (for instance Iraqi 58% men, Iranians 53% men). The relatively new immigrant groups, Poles and Soviet citizens consist of a larger percentage of women (both 60 % women). The distribution in age groups also depends on the time of arrival. Among Indonesians an aging population is more and more visible. The first arrived Turkish and Moroccan guest workers are now in their sixties and seventies. Among the new immigrant groups, like Iraqi, Iranians, Afghani's, we don't see many elderly. In general the non-western immigrant groups have larger families than the Dutch and the western immigrants.

The socioeconomic status of immigrants from the neighbouring countries is either similar to the level of the Dutch or better. The socioeconomic standard of non-western immigrant groups is generally poorer than the Dutch level. This is particular true for the former guest workers from Morocco and Turkey and for refugees. This general remark is not true for every particular ethnic group. Figure 1 shows the percentage of people working and/or on welfare per ethnic group. Welfare includes social security benefit, unemployment benefit, health benefit or disability allowance.

**Figure 1 Unemployment as a percentage of the labour force between 2001 and 2008 for Dutch and the largest ethnic categories.**




Source: CBS Persbericht 17 February 2009 'Werkloosheid niet Westerse allochtonen in 2008 licht gedaald'.

As figure 1 shows the unemployment of Dutch is considerably lower than that of non-western immigrants and their children. As we showed in the CLIP city report in 2008 \*(Van Heelsum 2008), this does not improve for the second generation



Figure 2 Percentage of persons with work (light blue) and/or welfare (dark blue) in 2004 (15–65 year old)



Source: WODC, Integratiekaart 2006, p.26 (made from information by SSB)

As figure 2 shows, the percentage of working people is among all ethnic groups larger than the percentage of people on welfare, except for Afghani, Iraqi and Somali refugees.<sup>1</sup> The highest percentages of working people and the lowest percentages of people on welfare are found among Dutch, and people from Hong Kong, the Philippines and China. Though the three refugee groups from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia are the most problematic groups, not all refugee groups have a larger proportion of people on welfare than working: this is not true for Vietnamese (who arrived relatively earlier) and Iranians. The four largest non western immigrant groups, Suriname, Turks, Moroccans and Antilleans have relatively more often the net very low social security benefit (a basic sum to survive) while the Dutch have more often the net higher

<sup>1</sup> Asylum seekers are not allowed to work until they receive their refugee status, and this can take up to 10 years.

unemployment benefit (a percentage of their last income). The Turkish groups counts more people with a disability allowance than on social security benefit.

## 2.2 National policy context

### *Integration policies*

Rijkschroef, Duyvendak & Pels (1993) divide the national policies concerning immigrant in three phases. The first phase in the seventies was a categorical policy focussing at specific fields. There were special provisions for Moluccan ex-soldiers. The Surinamese, who were not expected in such large numbers, were ad hoc supported by welfare associations, paid by several municipalities. In the '*Nota Buitenlandse Werknemers*' (1970) guest workers were stimulated to stick to their identity and culture of origin, not to have difficulties on return. Due to the assumption of temporariness, no attempts were made to provide courses with Dutch language and information on the society. A long-term consequence is that the language proficiency of these low educated men is often limited up to this moment.

The second phase starts with a WRR publication of 1979, which led to the first policy document called '*Minderhedennota 1983*' (Minority policy 1983). The Dutch government realised that the stay of guest workers was not temporary anymore and the thinking about immigrants shifted to more worry and concern. This policy was directed at stopping a trend that immigrants were acquiring a permanent disadvantaged social position and measures were taken on the terrain of education and labour market. Integration was considered a two-sided process, and respect for the cultures of immigrants was important in this policy document. There was a positive attitude towards the rights of religious groups, for instance on establishing mosques and Hindu temples.

Rijkschroef and others (2003) call the third phase 'integration policy', starting in 1989 with the WRR document '*Allochtonenbeleid*' (Policy on Allochtonous). Documents like '*Contourennota Integratiebeleid Etnische Minderheden 1994*' (Integration Policy Ethnic Minorities) '*Investeren en Integreren 1994*' (Investing and Intergrating), '*Kansen krijgen, kansen pakken 1997-1998*' (Getting opportunities, seizing opportunities) show an urge to motivate and mobilise immigrants to learn the language, increase information and to adjust to Dutch culture. Professional courses became obligatory for newcomers. The problems of the children of immigrants in the educational system become clearer and are now targeted.

A fourth phase started around 2001 when a representative of the right wing parties became minister of integration affairs, first Nawijn (LPF) and then Verdonk (VVD). Both were known for anti-immigrant standpoints. Many proposals to limit the rights of foreigners to a level below the rights of Dutch were discussed in the second chamber, but implementation was not always realistic because the inequality of law was too serious. The debate in the media became harsher and more unfriendly to immigrants, and many of them felt very uncomfortable. This period lasted until the elections of 2006. The new government since 2007 has a friendlier approach to immigrants.

Important changes in the policies on integration/citizenship for the municipalities took place with the '*Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers*' (Law Citizenship Newcomers) effective from January 1st, 2007. Municipalities have become more responsible to support immigration guidance, as was shown in the second module of CLIP (Van Heelsum 2008).

*Policies on Associations of Immigrants*

Both on national and on local level subsidies are given to associations of immigrants. The Netherlands counts a large number of associations of immigrants: 1125 Turkish associations, 881 Surinamese associations, 720 Moroccan associations, 399 Moluccan associations, 244 Chinese associations and many of the other ethnic groups (Van Heelsum, 2004a and b). About one third of these organisations, particularly the religious ones, generate their own money with the help of gifts and contributions to pay their own building and activities. Some have very limited money and work in homes of members, like refugee associations. Another smaller section is run professionally and incorporated into the social, educational or broadcasting system. The last category (estimated about 45%) works with limited subsidies – usually from municipalities – and adds to their income by asking for entrance fees or contributions (Van Heelsum, 2004b). In the case that municipalities provide subsidies or a building, they usually require that an organisation cooperates on the goals of the integration policy.

As part of its official Minorities Policy, the Dutch government has promoted in the mid 1980s the establishment of national bodies representing the major immigrant groups in order to have a counterpart for consultations on policy issues concerning immigrants. The structure of those institutions was regulated in an Act of Parliament and the bodies are fully financed from public funds. The '*Landelijk Overleg Minderheden*' (LOM, National Council Minorities) exists of seven councils representing different nationalities. There is a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Caribbean, South European, Chinese and a Refugee council. The officials are employed by the ministry. The councils have associations as their members, and represent as much as possible all associations of that immigrant community. These bodies offer an opportunity for immigrant groups to voice their opinions and discuss their interests with Ministers and high civil servants. A critical few hold that they mainly serve to legitimize the policies of the government.

Another important body that was created and financed on national level is the '*Contactorgaan voor Moslims en Overheid*' (Contact Organ for Muslims and the government)<sup>2</sup>. This platform was also established as a discussion partner for the minister of Integration Affairs, and is as much as possible made up of all the Islamic denominations that exist in the Netherlands. The fact that it was assembled by the government is on the one hand an advantage, because otherwise the extremely different religious groupings wouldn't easily gather, but on the other hand a disadvantage, because traditionally powerful figures are chosen to represent the groups, and for instance young Moroccans don't feel represented as our interviewees remark.

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<sup>2</sup> According to the website (<http://www.cmoweb.nl>, in April 2009), the members are: 1) the Turkish Dyanet related 'Islamitische Stichting Nederland' (ISN) and 2) 'Stichting Turks Islamitische Culturele Federatie' (TICF) 3) Turkish Suleymancilar 'Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland' (SICN) 4) the Turkish 'Milli Görüş Noord Nederland' (MGN) 5) the Moroccan 'Unie van Marokkaanse Moslim Organisaties Nederland' (UMMON), 6) a Shia organ 'Overkoepelende Sji'itische Vereniging' (OSV), 7) Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie (NIF) 9) The mainly Surinamese/Pakistani 'World Islamic Mission' (WIM) 10) the 'Limburgse Islamitische Raad' (LIR) and 11) Vereniging Imams van Nederland (VIN) ().

*Policies on the separation between church and state*

The relation between church and state is based on two articles in the constitution: article 1 on non-discrimination and equal treatment and article 6 on the freedom of religion. A more explicit law on equal treatment, the '*Algemene Wet Gelijke Behandeling*' (General Law on Equal Treatment) applies in the Netherlands since 1994, and is meant to stop any form of discrimination. Maussen describes in the interview four principles that the Netherlands traditionally applies in the spirit of these laws<sup>3</sup>:

- Equal treatment, not only of citizens but also of religious and non religious organisations. This means that a faith based association such as '*Leger des Heils*' (the Salvation Army) may not be rated lower when it sets up social work than a non-religious association. In line with this principle, already in 1977, a decree on meat inspection made Islamic slaughter possible, and a change in the law on burying in 1991 made Islamic burying possible.
- Religious freedom is not only a negative freedom (in the sense that it shouldn't be obstructed) but also positive: the government can sometimes actively provide for religious needs, for instance, it can help to make a place of worship possible; this is called the social component of basic rights. Of course public space rules apply like safety of the building, and noise. Yet, since the constitutional revision of 1983 there is no direct financing of religion any longer.
- The public sphere is pluriform and should not be dominated by the state. So it's considered better to have several types of schools than one state-school. Within the school system public, Catholic, Protestant, Muslim and Hindu schools are given the same subsidies, as long as they follow the national curriculum and apply certain quality criteria. Also within the national broadcasting system a Muslim and a Hindu broadcasting organisation get subsidies, just like the many other broadcasting organisations.
- There is an emphasis on freedom of choice. This means that there is a protection against religious coercion, and on the social terrain there has to be a choice. So if there is social work for youngsters, there have to be at least two institutions to give people a choice.

The history of church-state relations the Netherlands has been strongly marked by pillarisation, though this is not the active system any longer. As Maussen remarks, pillarisation principles are actually very modern again, since pluriformity is already important in this context and the system can easily apply also to ethnic and religious groups. Relations between the state and religious institutions have changed since 1983, though mosques were helped incidentally because of the principle that Muslims have equal rights for places of worship and had arrears. There was not really a systematic policy on the housing of minority religions, but there was occasional support by municipalities (Maussen 2009: 53-54). Since 2000 politicians have instigated a public debate that the system has to change, and that the state should have as little to do with religious organisations as possible. On the other hand the national government is supporting a competence training for Imams since 2002 which includes a course and a guidebook on citizenship for 'spiritual caretakers' (see Maussen 2006: 241). And since 9/11 and the murder of Theo van Gogh, a debate takes place to what extent the state has to a) support a liberal Islam, b) exert some form of supervision, particularly on schools and c) to have anti-radicalisation policies. In March 2009 '*Vereniging Nederlandse*

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<sup>3</sup> For more information Maussen (2006: 17) '*Ruimte voor de Islam*'.

*Gemeenten*' (VNG, Association of Dutch Municipalities) has published a manual for municipalities about religion in the public sphere, which firstly treats the legal limits of religion and public sphere and secondly gives advice on integration policy and religious organisations, the relations with religious associations and some solutions from practice (VNG, 2009) .

### 3 Background information on the city

#### 3.1 Brief description of the city

Breda is a medium size city with a population of 172.085 inhabitants (per 1 January 2009, O&I Breda). It acquired the official status of a town (town rights) in 1252 around the castle of Breda. In the 14th century it was surrounded with a defence wall and canals.

1) Historically it is an army town. There are several institutes for middle and higher education in the army and even a small, but unique in the country, military university (since 1828 in the castle). These institutions are the result of connection with the royal family for over 750 years. Many historical buildings, in the centre of town (castle, cathedral, harbour, gardens) and outside the town (country houses, hunting grounds with facilities) also result from the royal connection. These buildings have become tourist attractions.

Breda's city centre is compact, the surface is well used and the density of building is quite high. From the 1950's onwards the city expanded its borders, large new housing areas were built and several villages and industrial areas were incorporated. Also in the last ten years new neighborhoods have been added. The former villages, which belong to Breda nowadays, have kept their special village culture and character. The housing projects from the 50's now need improvement. The map of Breda outside the city walls looks like a patchwork of industrial areas, housing areas and green village areas.

2) Breda has always been a centre of trade. Because of the central position in the province Brabant, on the crossroads from north to south, and right in between the big harbours of Rotterdam and Antwerp (Belgium), Breda is an ideal place for establishing the main offices of international companies. There has been some industry, like textile, chemics, chocolate, beer and fruit products (juices, canned fruit, soft drinks), but almost all of them have closed their gates. There were no big factories, attracting low-skilled workers. This is the reason that Breda only hosts 10% non-western inhabitants. Breda is currently trying to present itself as a modern service-, high tech and culture based city. The high tech- and creative technical industry is leaping forward and Breda would like to address itself as "game-valley". Recently a "gaming-academy" was opened, to train future game-designers.

Next to this Breda aims at logistic services, knowledge industry and hospitality.

3) In the field of culture Breda has one of the biggest theatres in the region, which attracts people from a large distance. The cultural climate is a bit conservative, although this is changing slowly in the last years. Experimental forms of art and theatre are not often found in Breda, in contrast to Tilburg, which is about 35 kilometers. Breda doesn't have a university, possibly this explains the conservative, somewhat "bourgeois" culture. Breda is a middle class town. Statistics on Breda in all kinds of fields show often a striking similarity with the average statistics of the Netherlands.

4) Breda has a central function in the region of Western Brabant, in terms of shopping, social services, hospitals and cultural facilities. Breda has a fast train connection with Rotterdam and Antwerp, the new High Speed Line (HSL) will pass through Breda. When the HSL is finished it will give Breda excellent connections to Antwerp, Brussels, Paris and Barcelona.

5) Breda is the first city after crossing the main rivers that divide the North and the South of the Netherlands. The South is supposed to be more easy going, which is related to Catholicism and a more 'Burgundian' lifestyle. This means people like to enjoy good meals, drink and like to party. This in contrast to the Calvinist culture that rules the north. Breda is known for its bars and of course the carnival.

Important for this CLIP module is that Breda holds the seat of a Bishop. Breda is traditionally part of the Roman Catholic southern belt of the Netherlands. Currently about 60% of the population is officially registered Catholic, and 2–3% Protestant, according to the reverent we interviewed. The last Bishop Muskens was famous for his remarks that poor people have the right to steal bread if they have nothing to eat.<sup>4</sup> Muskens initiated a lot of contact with other religious groupings, including Jews and Muslims, but the newly appointed bishop thinks that should be left to the parishes, as we will further explain in section 4.3. A recent development is that some 2% of 'new Protestants' have arrived in Breda, according to the reverent.

### 3.2 The city's migrant population and its characteristics/main groups

On Jan 1st, 2009 about 79% of the population of Breda consists on autochthonous Dutch; about half of the immigrants is of non-western origin, while the other half is of western origin (this includes the second generation with at least one parent of immigrant origin). Table 3 shows the largest foreign categories.

**Table 3 Composition of the population Breda in ethnic groups, per Jan 1st, 2009**

	Number	Percentage
Dutch	135,801	78,9%
Moroccans	5168	3,0%
Dutch Indies (Moluccans)	3968	2,3%
Turks	2915	1,7%
Belgians	2816	1,6%
Surinamese	2048	1,2%
Antilleans	2024	1,2%
Germans	1910	1,1%
Indonesians	1536	0,9%
Poles	1166	0,7%
Yugoslavian	1046	0,6%
British	817	0,5%
Chinese	573	0,3%
Afghans + Iraqi + Iranian + Somali	731	0,4%
Others	9,566	5,6%
Total	172,085	100,0%

Source: GBA/O&I, 2009.

The 2009 data on the Breda website only provide the numbers of Moroccans, Turks, Surinamese, Antilleans and the rest merged into one group. Per 1-1- 2009 Moroccans increased from 5,007 to 5,168; Turks increased from 2,866 to 2,914; Surinamese have diminished slightly from 2,052 to 2,047, Antilleans increased from 1,996 to 2,075. There has also been an increase in the number of Poles and Chinese, and a

<sup>4</sup> The now retired Bishop Muskens was known as the Bishop with the social face or the red Bishop. He was against the forced celibacy of priests and for the use of condoms to stop aids. Some remarks became famous like 'those who don't have anything to eat, have the right to steal bread' and 'the Vatican should call God Allah during the mass' ([http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiny\\_Muskens](http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiny_Muskens))

reduction in the number of Dutch Indian and Indonesians. Surinamese, Dutch Indian and Indonesians tend to go to suburbs in other cities also.

The gender division of the ethnic groups in table 3 is in nearly in all cases 50/50, except among the Dutch and among 'others' where we find more women among whom East European and South Americans.

A specific situation in Breda compared to most other Dutch cities, is that Breda has a Moluccan neighbourhood. In 1951 the former soldiers of the Dutch army in Indonesia KNIL were demobilised in camps in the Netherlands. The national government asked several cities to build neighbourhoods for these Moluccans, since they wanted to stay together and thought that they would one day get the chance to move back to the independent *Republic Moluccu Selatan* on the Moluccan islands. Breda has build 93 houses for this specific group between 1963–1966, and another 15 in 1982. Currently 130 Moluccan families live in a neighbourhood, that is called *De Driesprong* and that also has a Moluccan Evangelical Church and a community centre. The fact that the Moluccan community existed of ex-soldiers (and their wives and children) made them feel at ease in a town with a military tradition like Breda. Because of the military academy in Breda it was one of the few places they knew in the Netherlands. Moluccans refuse up to now the Dutch nationality and have remained stateless. The Moluccan community signed an agreement with the local authorities to ensure that their culture and way of life is respected within the background of the special historic circumstances. Breda is one of the 70 municipalities that have a Moluccan area.

The second considerable immigration was of Surinamese, Antilleans, Turks and Moroccans. Of course Turks and Moroccans came for work, or were selected by the numerous agencies that 'imported' labour force", Breda is a so called "Antillean city" because more than 1% of the population comes from the Antilles (Dutch Caribbean)

The immigration by refugees in the last ten years is a consequence of the national policy. When asylum seekers receive their refugee status, their names are forwarded to municipalities everywhere in the country that are obliged to provide them with suitable housing outside the normal waiting lists.

A recent development is that the Polish community that existed of ex soldiers since the Second World War, grew the last two years with new immigrants from Poland.

The age structure of the bigger migrant groups is very different from the average in Breda. Especially Turks and Moroccans have high percentages of young people, for instance: Turkey: 62% younger than 29 years, 33% is younger than 14 years. This is almost the same among Moroccans. Among Surinamese 27% is between 10 and 27 years old. Half of the population that come from the Antilles is between 9 and 29 years. Among the Surinamese and Antilleans 30% lives in a one-parent-family, very often with only the mother, only 17% live in a two-parent-family. Of the Turks and Moroccans over 50% live in a complete family with father and mother.

The socio economic position of Surinamese, Turks, Moroccans, Antilleans and refugees is in general not very good. Most of the migrants have a low income, so they depend on social housing. They are also more often unemployed. Compared to the percentage of the total population, they are 1.4 to 2.8 times more often unemployed. Considering the fact that a lot of migrant women are not working, this rate is even higher.

The unemployment among people over 40 years old is very high, compared with the Dutch. This group is very often unemployed or on disability benefit or for a longer period and has limited chances to ever find work again.



The information on the Moluccan group comes from a different source. When the Moluccan neighbourhood is rank ordered in a list of all Breda's deprived neighbourhood, it ends up in the 23rd position, while the neighbourhood where most Moroccans live ends up somewhere in the top of the list. This shows that the position of Moluccans have relatively improved in the last 20 years.

### **3.3 The city' Muslim population and its characteristics**

When calculating the number of Muslims, a rough estimate is to add up all people where Muslims are a majority. The two largest groups are Turks (2,866) and Moroccans (5,007). Turks and Moroccans add up to 7,873, which is 4.6% of the population (per Jan 1st, 2007). Including the many smaller nationalities (for instance 301 Iraqi, 150 Iranians 348 Afghans, 223 Somali's, etc.) makes 9,222 (5.4 %). We estimate that the number of non-Muslim Turks and Moroccans compensates for the Muslims in the many smaller groups, like Iranians, Iraqi, Afghans, Somali's, etc. So actually the 4.6% will be nearer to the truth.

We have no information other information on the characteristics of the Muslim populations than what was already presented in section 3.2.

## 4 Local intercultural policies in general

In this chapter we will first turn in 4.1 to Breda's policies towards immigrant integration, which are actually formulated in such a way that they are intercultural policies, and then in 4.2 to its policies towards immigrant and religious associations. In 4.3 we will go on with intercultural and inter religious dialogue by associations, both formal and informal. In 4.4 'relationships between ethnic groups', we will focus on attitudes in the population, and not on associations. In 4.5 we will look at the communication and media.

### 4.1 Responsibility in the city and general approach to ethnic issues

#### *Responsibility*

Breda has a broad coalition of four left and centre parties (Dutch Labour Party/PvdA, Christian democrats/CDA, Green left/Groen Links and the local party Breda '97). There are six aldermen. The diversity policy is part under responsibility of the alderman (a lady) for 'Social Affairs, Labour market, Wellbeing, Integration, Land, the companies (BSW) and Accommodation'.

The diversity policy is executed within the *Dienst Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling* (DMO, Department of Social Development). Until 2009 the diversity policies were basically written and executed by one person (our CLIP contact person), who is in constant discussion with all the colleagues that she needs for specific topics. It's clear that this is a difficult position since the official cannot always fully determine what happens in other departments. The solo position is a problem, continuity is already at risk if the official has a flu, and all contacts would disappear if she would take another job. Of course the policy is officially determined by the city council.

#### *General approach towards ethnic issues*

The integration policy of Breda effective in May 2009, is described in the last policy document '*Integratie Agenda 2005-2006*' (Integration Agenda 2005-2006). This policy document was based on research in the '*Monitor 2004*', and basic principles from an earlier policy document '*Couscous met Appelmoes 2000*' (Couscous with applesauce). The separate document on women '*Dunya*' is also still part of the policy until the new policy paper will pass the Council in the next months.

As the author of the above documents explained, the policy was based on three principles: equality of cultures, equal chances and opportunities and reciprocity. Though it uses the definition of integration from a national document (*Commissie Blok*), it was fully based on the concepts and thinking of a diversity policy.

Both the monitor and the policy document consist of four main chapters, namely 1) housing (note that the word 'wonen' in Dutch means both housing and living, so this includes neighbourhood work and safety) 2) work 3) care, subdivided in education, well-being, health, and 4) culture (performing arts). Subjects like political participation, migrant associations or religious services for migrants are only mentioned. After this, we find a chapter that states that the implementation of the policy will concentrate on the neighbourhoods that are subject of restructuring and that have high concentration of immigrants. Because of the combination of problems in these areas like bad quality houses, unsafety, unemployment and school dropout, a goal should be to offer coherent services on neighbourhood level. A direct consequence of the diversity thinking is, that the next chapter is devoted to interculturalisation of the services, and firstly the local administration itself. This includes the proposal to set targets on the number of immigrant staff and a

project on developing intercultural competence among the employees. The last chapter – on communication – focuses also on intercultural competences, besides it aims to gain public support of the policy.

All chapters have lists of projects that are either implemented or wanted in the future, with their goal, the responsible department and partners and the source and amount of funds. Not surprisingly, the largest list of projects and allocated funds are found under ‘care’ and well-being, the department where the officer resides.

A separate document ‘*Dunya*’ has been written in 2004 on immigrant women, because of Breda’s involvement in the *PaVEM* activities<sup>5</sup>. It contains a quick scan with demographic and socio-economic information, the so-called Participation agenda, and a list of planned projects with possible financial sources. The *Dunya* approach focuses on language, social participation and work. Plans include language lessons at home for women that cannot get out of the house, plans to attract more women for the usual language programmes through schools and nurseries, and plans for a follow-up language courses if language proficiency after the first course is too low for labour participation (so called *Taal-plus*). The work programme in Breda includes among others: coaching 10 higher educated women to find work, lead at least 8 women to volunteer work, recruit 50 work placements by organising an employer breakfast, furnish an information centre with access for women to computers. Another tool to promote social participation, which was introduced by the *PaVEM* committee, was the local “P-team” (P. for Participation). This is a group of 10–15 women with different cultural backgrounds, who advises the local authorities and organisations on cultural diversity and integration policy from the viewpoint of migrant women. Breda was the first to have such a P-team. In 2007 a junior P-team was established, 6–10 young women (16–24 years old) direct their advice to girls and young women on issues as education, career and social participation.

The policy seems politically left oriented, which shows in the choice of the main subjects. The criterion for success is usually the participation rate in the different fields. The city council and mayor and aldermen have tried to counterbalance the negative imaging in the national policy of the last government, even when representatives of their own political party proclaimed it. Breda was happy with the national integration policy of Minister of Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration, Ella Vogelaar, who send out a so called *Handreiking* (helping hand) in 2008 with the title, ‘*Datgene wat ons bindt*’ (that which connects us). Her line was considered migrant friendly and multicultural, and Breda liked this. Her views became an issue within the national *PvdA* (Social Democrats) and she was replaced on 14 November 2008 by Eberhard van der Laan. Breda wants to proclaim a positive view on immigration. The credo is: Breda is a city where everyone feels safe, welcome and respected. It wants to provide opportunities, facilitate dialogue and include immigrants in policymaking, labour market and politics. Already during the right wing cabinets in the beginning of the century, the city ignored certain aspects of the national policy. Currently this is happening again, when it come to security and anti-radicalisation, as we will see in chapter 6.

In 2007 a proces started to develop a new policy document. Focusgroups and evaluation talks were held to hear what people think of the issues. On 11 september 2007 a presentation of the results from these

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<sup>5</sup> Between 2003 and 2005 the national Pavem Commission – Pavem whichs stands for participation of women from ethnic minorities – had extra means for work with migrant women.

focusgroups led to a proposal for the main points of the new policy paper. It seemed a nice and positive meeting to the author, but after that the atmosphere changed. In Januari 2008 the new concept diversity policy document for 2008–2012 '*Meedoen en Verbinden*' (Participating and Connecting) was ready and presented by the elderman in public, it was planned to go to the Council meeting of 23 January 2008. But some representatives of migrant communities, who had not been part of the focusgroups, interefered. They called a meeting and protested that the document was written by a white official behind his desk at the town hall for immigrants, and that it was not a policy by immigrants. Because of the fierce reaction the elderwoman halted the proces and promissed the protesters that they would get the chance to participate in constructing a new policy paper.

This decision led to a completely new procedure and a new form of policy construction. It was decided that a public inquiry process 'from below' would get shape, with the help of the communication department of the Breda administration and the *Stichting Interuniversitair Onderzoek en Ontwikkeling op het gebied van organiseren, veranderen, vernieuwen en leidinggeven* (SIOO, Foundation for interuniversity research and development on the terrains of organisation, change, renewal and leadership). The proces chosen was '*Appreciative Inquiry*', developed by the American professor in organisational behaviour, David L. Cooperrider<sup>6</sup>. In this bottom up ideology of governing, citizens get the chance to fill in their taks and the learning possibilities of all are recognised (*Samen aan de Slag*, 2009, p. 8). Instead of negation and critics, appreciative inquiry is basically a positive proces, in search of what people see as their dreams and the focus is on discovery and design. The intentions were to inspire people to join in the policy making proces, to activate them and to make them enthousiastic. As a starting point, so called *Stadsgesprekken* (Town Discussion) took place and this resulted in fourteen issues, and these issues became project proposals.<sup>7</sup> A *Bouwgroep* (Building Group) was established, to steer this proces. The task of the members of this *Bouwgroep* was to prepare an introduction on something that really involves him or her, on which a discussion could be based. Many of the iniatives came from a member of the *Bouwgroep*.

#### *Issues, demands and interests of immigrants*

The fourteen initiatives that came forward can be considered the main issues, demands and interests of immigrants in Breda. They cover the following six subjects:

1. Integration (*inburgering*). Projects will be (further) developed considering: a) Dutch language training for those who have long stayed in the Netherlands, but never learned the language, and b) putting the sometimes isolated people together in pairs with Dutch nationals who can visit them and practice Dutch.
2. Education: a) one of the worries of immigrants is that their children do not get very well through the test that determines their secondary school level, so extra support needs to take place; b) it was also considered important to stimulate pupils with the method of '*Appreciative inquiry*' to discover their dreams, to design a career and to explore their possible role in society, with a path towards actual realisation; c) reading aloud by older boys and girls for the young ones.

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<sup>6</sup> For more information see [http://www.12manage.com/methods\\_cooperrider\\_appreciative\\_inquiry.html](http://www.12manage.com/methods_cooperrider_appreciative_inquiry.html)

<sup>7</sup> These discussion have been filmed, see <http://www.breda-morgen.nl/stadsgesprekken.php>

3. Work, in this field three initiatives were developed: a) supporting poor working people, to become examples for unemployed; b) bringing employers and high educated immigrants together to 'wake up' the employer about the unused potential; c) getting a more diverse staff in the Town Hall. Notice that this was an initiative of an official of the Personnel Department of the Breda administration, and not from a citizen!
4. Housing, in this field neighbourhood initiatives were suggested, like three meetings in the community centre, common Iftar during Ramadan and activities in the neighbourhood.
5. Social integration: five projects were suggested: the parent as a guide, the future of youngsters (music and radio), keep moving, my friend, (art and culture, used to have neighbourhood shows), sport demonstrations of clubs to attract foreign kids, and bringing old and young together.
6. Active citizenship: connecting initiatives by organising a festival and forming councils or migrants and in neighbourhood.
8. Safety: keeping neighbourhoods free of criminality, violence and polarisation, by preventing where this is possible and repressing where needed.

All project proposals are coordinated by the *Bouwgroep* and carried by a small group that may go ahead with the implementation, if the council agrees.

After this phase of finding issues that citizens like to work on, it was clear that the initiatives were more or less independent ideas, and didn't have a common philosophy. Therefore a broader paper was developed by officials in interaction with relevant organisations and individuals in 2008, called '*Maatschappelijke Visie Breda 2020*' (Social Vision on Breda 2020). As chapter 3 of this paper shows, this vision is basically formulated around four leading themes: 1. *goed toeven* (a nice place to stay), 2. *groeien in Breda* (growing in Breda), 3. *meedoen* (participating), and 4. *gezond en zorgzaam* (healthy and caring).

Ad 1. *Goed toeven* (a nice place to stay). The ambition within the first theme is that Breda should remain a good place to stay for its inhabitants, because organisations and administration keep investing in citizens and their networks. Secondly city and neighbourhood facilities should enhance contact, development and connections. Safety is related to this theme.

Ad 2. *Groeien in Breda* (growing in Breda). The ambitions are that the youth can grow without worries in an attractive surrounding, that Breda is an challenging town for town for youth to develop broadly, to grow and to relax, and in Breda you count when you are young.

Ad 3. *Meedoen* (participating). The ambitions are: in Breda we take care that everyone can participate, since everyone is needed, and the administration supports people in their creativity, initiatives and ambitions.

Ad 4. *Gezond en zorgzaam* (healthy and caring). The ambitions are that inhabitants of Breda, volunteers, voluntary and professional caretakers work together for a healthy and caring society, and that care is within reach and accessible.

In chapter 3 of the new policy paper, the 14 initiatives are connected to these four leading themes, and in chapter 5 to the already mentioned national document '*Handreiking. Datgene wat ons bindt*' (helping hand, that, which connects us). It becomes clear that the national paper has a few extra themes that were not covered before, like more attention for security, anti-radicalisation and anti-polarisation, for preventing immigrant concentrations in schools and neighbourhoods and active policies to stop discrimination on the labour market. A few elements from the national advice are taken over, like Breda will try to prevent concentration of new East European immigrants in neighbourhood by interfering in the house allocation

system, or at least it is planning to transfer this intervention to the Breda's document on Housing *Woonvisie*. Activities to stop radicalisation and polarisation are not directly considered a local responsibility, though Breda gave a research assignment to find out to what extent this is relevant for Breda was given to the *Insituut for Veiligheids en Crisismanagement* (COT, Institute for Safety and Crisis management).

The advantage of this consultative method of working is clearly that groups of volunteers are motivated to cooperate with the municipal in the execution of the policy. It is a bottom up policy. It still has to become clear to what extent financial resources will also be allocated to the migrants and consequently not to the general social work associations. As we have seen, the new method of consultation also has problems. Firstly the 14 issues that were raised had to be put together afterwards for a consistent line, and actually some relevant issues seem to be missing. They also don't cover all the issues that are considered important by the national government. We noticed in our interviews with representatives of the religious associations and Muslim groups (see 4.2) that there are also religious and identity issues, which did not come forward during the consultation process. Secondly citizens can overestimate the financial resources that can go to migrant associations, while some resources are allocated to general social services. A serious problem with this kind of initiatives from citizens is that an unelected and random group determines policy and claims representativity, while the elected bodies' voice from Second Chamber or City Council diminishes in weight. The challenge for Breda is to bring the top-down and bottom up approach together.

#### **4.2 Immigrant associations and immigrant religious associations and the policies towards them**

In this section we will first look at number and type of associations of immigrants, then at religious associations, then at funding and then at the issues that associations consider relevant.

##### *Associations of immigrants*

According to the already mentioned database for the study '*Migrantenorganisaties in Nederland*' (Van Heelsum 2004), Breda had seven Surinamese associations, sixteen Turkish associations, eight Moroccan associations and seven Refugee associations at the time of that research. A check in the *Kamer van Koophandel* (Chamber of Commerce) shows that there have been quite some changes in the last five years. A list of the current and past associations has been added in Appendix 1. Only one Surinamese association is left, one Antillean, six Moroccans, seven Turkish, one Turkish/Moroccan centre for youngsters, five Moluccan (and three non registered ones), one Chinese (and three not registered ones), eight African, one Cambodian, three Polish, one Spanish and one Bosnian association.

The authorities have contacts with one Surinamese association, with most of the Turkish and Moroccan associations, with the Moluccan neighbourhood committee, and with the Spanish and at least one African association. The Polish association of former soldiers in the Second World War is only contacted when there are memorials of the Second World War. With the other Moluccan, Polish, Bosnian and Chinese associations there are no contacts. According to the city representative there is contact with all powerful associations.

##### *Religious associations*

The largest religious community in Breda is the Roman Catholic one (60% according to the reverent we interviewed). Not only the Dutch are part of this community, but also Surinamese, Antilleans, Poles, Greeks,

Spanish and some Africans. Besides the bishopric there are two Catholic parishes in Breda, the *Jeruzalem Parish* in central Breda, and the *Bethlehem parish* in *Breda Noord*. A separate organisation for Polish Catholics (*Poolse Katholieke Vereniging in Nederland*) existed, but has been discontinued. According to the address list of a Chinese umbrella association, the Taiwanese *Stichting Evangelische Zending onder de Chinezen in Europa* (CEME, Taiwanese Foundation for Evangelic Mission among Chinese in Europe) has a branch in Breda, called *Kergenootschap CEME Breda* (Congregation CEME Breda), but we didn't get the chance to verify this information.

Only 5% of Breda's population is protestant, according to the reverent, of which maybe 3% of Dutch protestant churches and 2% of the new protestant churches. According to the director of social work, there are 4 or 5 new protestant churches, with a lot of Surinamese and Antillean members. Of the Moluccans in Breda 90% is Protestant. For the three Moluccan protestant religious communities in Breda a church building called Immanuel is in use since the sixties in the Moluccan neighbourhood. The three religious communities are: *Geredja Injili Maluku*, *Geredja Protestant Maluku di Belanda* en *Geredja Protestant Maluku di Belanda Maart 53*. The Chinese community has a separate Lutheran youth club, called *Breda Lutherse Jeugd Club voor Chinezen* (Breda Lutheran Youth Club for Chinese). There has been a Congolese *Eglise Kongolais Les Messagers* (Congolese Church the Messengers), but it has either moved or closed. An Evangelic Baptist community is also active.

Breda counts five religious associations of Muslims. There are two official mosques, one Turkish, the *Yeni mosque* (*Islamitische Stichting Nederland Yeni | Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi Yeni*) and one Moroccan, the *Rahman Mosque*. The Turkish mosque is part of the Dyanet system, with the federation of *Islamitische Stichting Nederland* (ISN, Islamic Foundations the Netherlands) on top in the Netherlands, and related to the national Islamic denomination in Turkey, and mainly visited by the first generation. While the Turkish mosque has no mosque architecture, the Moroccan one is newly build and recognisable (we will elaborate on the building process in chapter 5). Besides these two real mosques, there are two well known places, where the prayer is held, one Turkish and one Moroccan. The Turkish one is *Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Breda* (Foundation Islamic Centre Breda) and related to the Süleymançılar movement. It functions under the umbrella of the federation *Stichting Islamitische Centrum Nederland* (SICN, foundation Islamic Centre the Netherlands). It has a boarding school for girls in the same building. They Süleymançılar movement is known to stress the devote and mystical aspects of Islam and to promote Koran education. On a spectrum of conservative to modernist Islamic movements, it is more in the first category though not in an extreme way, while the two mosques are of the intermediate stream. Süleymançılar promote for instance that girls wear the headscarf and that the sexes are separated during gymnastics.

The second Moroccan organisations that organises the prayer in Breda, is the *Stichting voor Islamitische Jongeren* in Breda (Antilooptstraat). This group also has a more conservative view on Islam than the Moroccan mosque. The board members wear beards and don't shake hands with women. They are particularly targeted at youngsters, and fulfil a very useful role towards youngsters that are searching for the real Islam, as we will further explain in chapter 5. There is also a Muslim organisation of the Indonesians/Molukkans, *Persatuan Pemuda Muslim se-Eropa wilayah Breda Ar-Rahman* (Union of Islamic Youngsters in Europa district Breda Ar-Rahman).

The Turkish Fetula Gülen movement has followers in Breda, but not everything happens in Breda itself. There is one organisation related to this movement called '*Educatie Centrum Breda*' and students join '*Cosmicus Brabant*' in Tilburg (*Cosmicus Öğrenci Derneği Tilburg/Güney Şubesi*). There is no mosque of the Turkish *Milli Görüş* movement in Breda, the nearest is in Uden. During the interviews we met some Muslims in Breda (Moroccans) that visit the conservative *Al Waqf Al Islami mosque* in Eindhoven.

For the rest Breda has a Buddhist group (*Boeddhisme van Nihiren en SGI Breda*), a Surinamese Hindu group called *Dosti Armaan AUM Pracharak Sabha Breda*<sup>8</sup>, a Jewish synagogue<sup>9</sup> and a Bahá'í group. Interesting about the Surinamese Hindu's in Breda is that they perform services of both Surinamese Hindu movements – the modernist *Arya Samaj* and the more traditional *Sanathan Darm* – as the schedule of services on their website shows.

**Figure 3 Hindu services of the Vishwa-Hindoe Mandier in the Petrus and Paulus Kerk in Breda.**



The board itself is from the *Sanathan Darm* movement, but clearly states that their *Mandir* (temple) is not bound to one movement or god like Vishna or Shiva. In 2006 the name *Aum Pracharek Sabha* was replaced by *Vishwa-Hindoe Mandir*, and this name means world. The services of the *Vishwa-Hindoe Mandier Breda* in

<sup>8</sup> More information, time and date of services and pictures of the see <http://www.mandierbreda.com>

<sup>9</sup> More information on the Jewish community in Breda <http://www.jhm.nl/nederland.aspx?ID=24>. The synagogue is owned by the *Nederlandse Israelitische Gemeente* (NIG, Dutch Israeli Community)



Breda were held in tow buildings of the Jeruzalem Parish (Catholic Parish for Central Breda): until 2007 in the *St. Michaelskerk* and of later in the *Petrus and Paulus Kerk* (church on Graaf Hendrik III Plein 28).

**Figure 4 Hindu services of the Vishwa-Hindoe Mandier in the Petrus and Paulus Kerk in Breda**



Source: website *Mandirbreda.com*.

#### *Funding for ethnic and religious organisations*

The national government, the province Brabant and the administration of Breda can provide subsidies that ethnic and to some extend also religious organisations can apply to. None of the associations in Breda has till now functioned on national level, though some have used the *Pavem* money we disussed earlier. Some of them were supported by *Steunfunctie Palet* (Palet is the support organisation for immigrant issues on provincial level)<sup>10</sup> to find funds on provincial level. If ethnic associations ask subsidies, this are mainly asked at the muncipal level. These kind of subsidies are in principle for those who provide services mainly on city level. There are two kinds of funds they can apply to: 1) to diversity funds, directly linked to the

<sup>10</sup> The Breda page on the Palet website: <http://www.palet.nl/subpagina.php?navid=354>

municipal policy goals of stimulating participation, social cohesion and integration and 2) *Fonds Maatschappelijke Ontwikkelingen* (FMO, Fund for Social Development)<sup>11</sup>.

In the current situation with the *Bouwgroep*, there is a lot of discussion on how the diversity funds should be allocated, and the associations think they should get a greater share. On the other hand some members of the *Bouwgroep* are aware of the fact that applying in the second fund – the *FMO* – leads to sums that are nearly ten times as big. The intention of this fund of 10 million euro for 2007–2011 is to support initiatives of citizens. Activities should fit in the following goals: activating citizens to come with ideas about their surrounding, increasing social cohesion and supporting groups with difficulties. The project has to develop into a durable service after the subsidy stops, so it has to be either profitable on its own or taken over by a service provider. The possibility was advertised in information meeting at migrant associations. Between 1 Jan 2007 and 2008, 117 ideas were suggested, many of them by migrant associations and meant to improve the situation in neighbourhoods where immigrants live. When someone comes with a project idea that looks attractive, the officials support them to turn it into a well-written proposal with a budget, so that lower educated people also have a chance. In the third round (July 2009) three out of twelve granted proposals were for migrant associations. Many of the other proposals were not particularly submitted by migrant associations but meant for migrants as part of youngsters or people in *Geeren Zuid* (a neighbourhood with a lot of migrants)

#### *Issues, demands and interests of immigrant and religious organisations*

The issues, demands and interests of migrant associations overlap to a large extent with the interests of migrants that were already described in 4.1. An issue that particularly concerns associations is that the associations would like to take over some of the social work that is now done by general social services, including the budget that is available for these services. One of the Moroccan representatives complains that professional organisations take large shares of this money, while migrant associations actually do much more work with volunteers.

An issue that concerns the religious associations is to find buildings where they can organise their services. As we have seen the Hindu's are using the Catholic Church and the Muslims tend to buy, build or rent their own buildings.

### **4.3 Forms of relation and dialogue**

We will distinguish two forms of dialogue in this paragraph: inter-cultural dialogue and inter-religious dialogue.

#### *Inter-cultural dialogue*

The process to come to a new policy paper that we have described under 4.1 is an innovative way of stimulating intercultural dialogue and the most interesting example for this chapter. The method of '*Waarderend Vernieuwen*' (Appreciative inquiry) brings citizens of all nationalities and backgrounds together

<sup>11</sup> More information on FMO funds:

<http://www.breda.nl/index.php?simaction=content&mediumid=32&pagid=1545&fontsize=12>

and stimulates them to dream about their common future, to formulate plans and carry out what they find important. Both the *Stadsgesprekken* (Town Discussions) and the *Bouwgroep* (Building Group) were joined by people of various nationalities and backgrounds including Dutch, Indonesians, Surinamese, Turks, Moroccans and Africans.

There have been several other attempts to constitute migrant councils and platforms in the past, but most of them broke down because they couldn't satisfy the request for representativity, and because of internal fighting. In 2004 the so called *Migrantenraad* (Migrant Council) was established by an Indonesian and a Moroccan representative. It was supposed to become a voice of all associations of immigrants. In 2008 it split into two councils because of internal quarrels, *Migrantenraad 1*, led by the Moroccan representative turned later into the *Werkgroep Marokkaanse Ouderen* (Workgroup Moroccan Elderly); later he joined the *Bouwgroep*. *Migrantenraad 2* led by the Indonesian representative went on with one Surinamese and one Moroccan lady, of whom the Indonesian joined the *Bouwgroep*. In 2008 an Algerian started the *Platform Marokkanen* (Platform Moroccans), but not all Moroccans liked the fact that he was actually not Moroccan. After this another fully Moroccan *Platform* was established by a younger Moroccan male, that brought together the Moroccan mosque, the women's group, Muslim youngsters and a group of fathers that patrol a neighbourhood. So currently there are three Moroccan platforms, and there is one intercultural group called *Instituut Winst Multiculturele Ontwikkeling* (IWMO, Institute Profit Multicultural Development), led by a Surinamese representative. To summarise the situation, the immigrants in Breda keep forming platforms but do not manage to cooperate in a stable manner. Due to Breda's size, the communities are small and the same figures turn up again in every council that is established, and the same fights start over and over again. On the other hand, the fact that the *Bouwgroep* deals with the actual policy and therefore also with funds, there is more motivation to maintain the cooperation. The future has to show whether or not the associations get the funds that they are now expecting and to what extent these funds will remain stable after the first evaluations.

Besides the Platforms, there were also several less politicised initiatives, directed at social contact and meeting each other. Since there are too many to mention them all, we will only treat an example now and we will describe the *Iftar* common meal during Ramadan in the Muslim chapter 5. In 2007 the diversity officer arranged informal 'Meet and Greet' gatherings between staff members of the departments of the municipal and groups of immigrants. The first one took place in the summer of 2007 with some 60 representatives of African organisations at the Town Hall. Another meeting was held with Moroccans in autumn of 2007. The reasoning behind this, is that staff members won't become intercultural when they don't have direct contact and if they don't get acquainted with some citizens. Interculturalisation training is not enough; it is necessary to develop practical knowledge among officials. A relation between people has to develop to let them communicate well. Officials get to talk to immigrants and get confronted directly with their questions. They learn to understand the immigrants, develop personal contacts in immigrant communities and they are also more easily found by these African representatives when they need something in the municipal organisations. Direct contact with for instance the official working on elderly, leads to direct phone calls with him or her and direct questions to him or her.

*Inter-religious dialogue*

The clearest initiative for inter-religious dialogue is the *Interreligieuze Werkgroep* (Inter-religious Workgroup). According to the protestant reverent, whom we interviewed, and who was part of it, it was established after 9/11, but a consequence of an earlier cooperation of Catholics and Protestants in *Stadspastoraat* (literally Town Parish). The first initiative, *Stadspastoraat*, was established in 2000. The well know Bishop Muskens of Breda established it by bringing in three Catholics, and this protestant reverent joined them to do all kinds of social work.

Because of 9/11 things accelerated. A month after 9/11 the first event was organised by what became the interreligious workgroup. This was a discussion evening with the title 'Islam, curse or blessing?', with some famous national figures like Mohammed Cheppi, someone from the synagogue and de VVD representative Henk Kamp.

As the reverent remarks about the goal: "The liveability of the city depends very much on stimulating discussion between groups. There is considerable xenophobia in Breda, when you hear people talking among each other, and talking together with other religions is necessary. We've consciously also involved non religious parties. There are a lot of rich young people in Breda, that think negative about immigrants. Muskens was also interested in the dialogue with Islam, since he had worked in Indonesia.

Not only Protestants and Catholics cooperated, but now also Jews (very actively), Moroccan Muslims (active, though the representative kept changing), in the beginning also a Turkish Muslim representative, there was a representative of the a protestant charismatic Indonesian church (*Pesekutuan Oikamene Indonesia Nederland*), the organisation of the Hindu's in Breda came twice and the organisations of Japanese Buddhists once. With the three Moluccan Church groups (Protestant) there is no contact, and we haven't heard anything about the two Chinese or the Polish group (see Appendix 1). The diversity coordinator of the municipal joined all meetings both because of personal interest and because the municipal thought that the administration had to be represented. Participation in this group resulted in a looser vision on the separation of church and state among local politicians. Informal contact between politicians and religious groups developed, and it influenced even the official speeches of the mayor and aldermen. They started using quotes from the Koran and the Bible, which was highly appreciated by local Muslims.

Meetings took place more or less monthly to prepare a big event once a year. The next event with Bishop Muskens took place in the large church of Breda, and the Turkish imam of the *Dyanet mosque* was invited to read a piece from the Koran. Another event was a quiz that was organised by Muslim youngsters, with funny questions with questions about known controversial issues. The answers made clear that people don't know much about each others religion and that they actual look more alike than they think.

Traditionally, there has been cooperation between the church and the municipality, partly because of the presence of the royalty in Breda, the director of the military has always been the administrator of the church funds, but financial relations were abolished in with the 1983 law. The current mayor and aldermen are positive towards cooperation, and would for instance give a speech at the departure/welcome of a bishop. That the diversity coordinator joined the Interreligious Workgroup informally, and that the administration organised an 'interreligious diner' in the City Hall shows that there are a lot of less formal way to cope with the separation of church and state. The workgroup was active from 2001 to 2007.

Unfortunately both *Stadspastoraat* and the *Interreligious Workgroup* were abolished when Bishop Muskens retired in 2007 and the pope replaced him by the less progressive Bishop van den Hende. The new bishop

thought that this kind of cooperation should take place on the level of parishes and not centrally at the Bishopric, and the progressive Catholics in Breda were too careful to protest. Currently the Bethlehem parish of North Breda still actively cooperates with the Moroccan mosque, since the mosque is on their territory, while these activities at the Jeruzalem parish in Central Breda have stopped.

Besides this attempt to establish interreligious dialogue there are some other interreligious initiatives that still continue. As we already showed there is cooperation in the use of church buildings for instance the Hindu's use the Catholic church buildings. Another example is the support from the churches together with a foundation of Africans for undocumented immigrants in *Stichting Ongedocumenteerde Buitenlanders* (STOB, Foundation Undocumented Foreigners) and the financial support for food and beds in *Stichting Vluchtbed* (Refuge Bed). Funds come from churches, *diaconieën* – i.e. separate social work departments of churches and from a social fund that is indirectly paid by the municipality (direct payment for undocumented would not be possible). Besides this, the *diaconieën* have always directly supported Christian immigrants like for instance the Arians from Iran and Iraq in Breda, this has been part of their humanitarian work in the city. The relations with the national *Werkgroep Interreligieuze Samenwerking* (WIS, National Workgroup Interreligious Cooperation), which recently changed name into *Stichting Interreligieuze Dialoog* (Foundation for Interreligious Dialogue <sup>12</sup>) remains intact.

Although there is no official policy towards interreligious matters, regularly attention is paid to the subject by the city, as the example introducing religious items (from Hinduism and Islam) in the festivities during Breda's celebration "Nassau 600 years" shows.

#### **4.4 Relationship between different ethnic groups in the city**

The last survey on interethnic contact was held in 1996. We have not found any surveys on the attitude of citizens of Breda on ethnic or religious issues. We have checked the *Burgerenquête* (Citizens survey) from 2000 to 2008, published on the Breda website, but social or attitudinal issues are not raised. Questions are asked about irritations in the public space that the municipal can directly solve like unsafe viaducts and there is not a single question on ethnic diversity or other social issues. In 2003 qualitative research has been done on how to improve intercultural contacts, but we haven't managed to get the results.

From the interviews it seems that there is quit a lot of prejudice particularly towards Moroccans and Muslims. One interviewee told us that compared to a Zaandam (near Amsterdam), where he had lived, Breda was much more openly racist. Another interviewee told us that serious racist incidents happen in Breda and surrounding that would end up immediately in the newspapers if it were to happen in Rotterdam. Breda chooses not to give attention to this, and thinks it will go down by not paying attention (see chapter 5). Since there is also no clear message that this is unwanted behaviour, people feel free to say anything bad about Moroccans and Muslims. At the same time the easygoing attitudes that are promoted in Breda as typically 'southern and Brabant' make relations also easier. Some of the immigrants we talked to also don't seem to

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<sup>12</sup> <http://www.interreligieuzedialoog.nl/?tag=stichting-interreligieuze-dialoog>

worry too much about negative remarks on immigrants and Muslims, but we would not be surprised if there is hidden anger in the Moroccan community.

Like in all parts of the Netherlands, there is a regional anti-discrimination office. Besides Breda has an active anti-discrimination policy, the mayor himself has been active several times to stop racism in bars and clubs.

#### **4.5 Public communication**

As we have shown earlier, Breda tends to promote itself as a relaxed and easygoing place, where conflicts don't easily escalate. There is no structural attention to prejudice against immigrants or against Muslims neither in the policy, nor in the way the authorities deal with the media. Generally the policy is to soften anything that could escalate.

The newly developed communication strategy '*Appreciative inquiry*' that we have described under 4.1 is not a media strategy but meant to involve citizens with policy making. As the representative of the communication department explains, a top down approach – consulting after the plan is ready – has become old fashioned. Summaries of the city discussions that have taken place have been turned into small videos that one can watch on the website of the municipality Breda.

#### **4.6 Summary and lessons learnt**

Breda had a turbulent history of platforms in which migrant associations tried to influence the policy. Until recently the administration was completely white, and not very open to newcomers. But after protests from immigrants, the city started with a completely new and innovative method of involving immigrants in policy making in 2008. With the method '*Appreciative inquiry*', active immigrants got the chance to determine priorities and to come with concrete plans. An active group came up a lot of initiatives were taken. To what extent resources will really go to migrant associations instead of going to general social services, and to what extent this will lead to well evaluated and stable services, still has to be seen in the future.

Generally Breda promotes itself as a Burgundian, relaxed and easygoing place, where everyone has time to chat to each other and conflicts don't escalate. Breda's small size adds to this, and the fact that there is a good network with a lot of contact between officials – particularly the diversity coordinator of the municipal and the people of the social work office should be mentioned – and the migrant associations. Parties are near to each other, so it's easy to spot problems. Direct contacts with associations seem to work very well, though better for the Moroccans and Turks than for the smaller communities like Chinese. Though the advantages of this informal approach are clear, the disadvantages are also visible in the fact that the administration doesn't directly address certain issues. For instance it doesn't clearly communicate that racist incidents are unwanted. In chapter 6 the consequences of this informal approach will become clearer when we treat the way in which Breda copes with radicalisation.

## 5 Local intercultural policies towards Muslim communities

### 5.1 Major issues, demands and interests

As we showed in chapter 3.3 the Muslim community in Breda exists of Moroccans, Turks, Surinamese, Pakistani's and a lot of smaller groups like Afghans, Iraqi's, Iranians and Egyptians. The murder of Theo van Gogh has not only affected Amsterdam, but also the rest of the Netherlands. We already treated the important issue of tense relations that arose after the murder on Theo van Gogh. Prejudices about Muslims are actually one of the greatest concerns to most Muslims themselves, and they conceive this as the main reason why their position in the educational system and on the labour market is not improving. On the other hand the stereotypical Dutch view on Muslims is that they are generally conservative, that they suppress women, and are not actively stopping their kids from criminal activities, while some even become sympathisers of fundamentalist movements. A lot of current issues relate to coping with these prejudices. Research from other cities shows that the prejudices are more directed towards Moroccan Muslims than towards Turkish or Surinamese Muslims (O+S Amsterdam, 2009). Moroccan Muslims are more of the scapegoat, and have also reacted more fiercely to fight the prejudices.

For the second generation the Muslim aspect of their identity is something that needs discussion, particularly with the background of Dutch society with it's prejudices. How to be a good Muslim in a Western society, is the question and it's not easy to determine one's position especially when it come to gender roles and finding the 'right' Islam. Wearing the headscarf or not and if so the 'modern' one or not<sup>13</sup>, virginity before marriage, marrying someone from a different ethnic background, sports, free or forced partnerchoice, and acceptance of homosexuality are issues. Can an employer refuse you because of your beard or headscarf? Can civil servants refuse to shake hands with women?

Parents who are barely literate, and who follow traditions from their vilages in North Morocco are not considered of help by the children who are used to reading and finding information from books and internet. Generally young people are struggling with their identities, searching for information. That they have to defend themselves towards the outside world, makes it more difficult. Some youngsters even tell their parents that they are not good Muslims, and go for a more conservative interpretation of Islam than their parents (De Koning 2007). The study of the reasons why some Muslim youngsters become radical, showed that the proces of searching for identity and feeling rejected by Dutch society is important in this (Slootman & Tillie 2006; Demant et al 2008).

Also in Breda the two main exisiting mosques were untill very recently first generation insitutions, dominated by erderly men. This made it difficult for the youngsters to come with their questions and

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<sup>13</sup> Dutch Moroccan girls developed a fashion with a tight black plus a colourful head scarf.

demands.<sup>14</sup> In the Moroccan mosque the imam spoke Arabic, while the home language of Moroccans is Berber or Dutch, and first generation imams may not be aware of the trouble that youngsters have in Dutch society. For some time internet imams have functioned for instance the Dutch convert Van Bommel. Because of this gap in the needs of youngsters, initiative have been taken by representatives of the second generation to establish their own associations.

The Turkish and the Moroccan case differ a lot. In the Moroccan community active youngsters have first tried to work within existing mosque, but couldn't manage to arrange something that fitted to their needs. They have established their own institution, the *Stichting voor Islamitische Jongeren* in a former factory building. It includes a prayer hall, a sporting space and several other rooms for educational and social activities. The organisation has till now on functioned without any subsidies of the municipal, though they recently asked for the first one. As we said in 4.2, the organising group has a more conservative view on Islam than the Moroccan mosque. The board members wear beards and don't shake hands with women. But they are open and in contact with the municipal, and extremely active in taking care of the youngsters, both in providing them social and sport activities as well as religious education. They have imams and organise the prayer. The lectures are in Dutch, since many youngsters don't know Arabic, and the youngsters can ask any question that disturbs them.

The chairman, whom we interviewed, explains that youngsters need a lot of support, particularly since 9/11 the consciousness and attentiveness has all of a sudden increased. The mosque's role became much more important, and discussion was necessary, also on radicalisation. In the first few years there was some (healthy) competition between the new organisation and the mosque. The activities are very well visited; up to 800 persons can turn up. Parents feel safe, if their son or daughter goes to the centre: they think it's better than hanging around in the street, even though the views are more conservative than their own. The association arranges the activities of boys and girls usually separately, because otherwise the girls don't come, though they actually think that separating boys and girls is a tradition from north Morocco and not something Islam prescribes. What real Islam is, is a point of discussion between the age groups. Since the parents are not educated, they don't know the difference. In Mecca, where Muslims go for the *Hadj*, the prayer takes place with men and women in one room, but this issue turned into a mayor debate on what real Islam means, between first and second generation in Breda, with the first (and moderate) generation Moroccans pleading for a separate room for women, and some of the actually more conservative members of the second generation pleading for one room.

The chairman explains that everything is based on knowledge. The visitors of the organisation have to learn about many of the issues that get discussed. For instance he doesn't understand where in the Koran the Taliban in Afghanistan found support to stop girls from going to school, he thinks this was actually unlawful since Mohammed's wives were all tutors and Mohammed teaches that women even have to educate themselves. Another often discussed issue – again related to knowledge – is the meaning of the word *Jihad*. The connotation of *Jihad* has become negative in the last eight years, as the chairman explains, because it is associated with terrorism, but the actual meaning is improving oneself by banning bad habits, taking care of

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<sup>14</sup> In the Moroccan mosques it is more difficult for youngsters than in the Turkish mosques. Turkish youngsters have less language problems (they know more Turkish than Moroccans Arabic) and Turkish boys are often involved by their fathers in the mosques.



each other, caring for your land when you get attacked. It is not known that only if you are attacked, a man-to-man-fight is allowed. Another issue that gets discussed is that according to the Koran, a man can marry four wives. Not many people seem to realize that the condition that the Koran states is: only if you can treat them completely equally: equal feelings of love, money, and care, and that is in practice extremely difficult and even impossible.

When the *Arrahman mosque* noticed how much activity the youngsters developed in the new centre, they wanted this also. In the last years the gap between first and second generation is diminishing.<sup>15</sup> The young fathers that now patrol the street in a neighbourhood safety project in *Breda Noord*, see more clearly what the dangers are that youngsters have to cope with. Of late a moderate active group of youngsters is developing around the *Arrahman mosque*. That the interview with representatives of both took place in the buildings of *Stichting voor Islamitische Jongeren* shows that the two cooperate rather closely. The *Arrahman mosque* recently hired a Dutch born imam, something that wouldn't have been possible 10 years ago. The older generation now sees that youngsters need this support urgently, and many things are becoming possible that were not possible earlier.

The representative of the *Arrahman mosque* explains that the anger of Moroccan youngsters is a time bomb, that needs steering. Especially boys see how anti-Muslim views can get articulated watch Dutch TV without any problem while they are forced to shut up, and secondly how high educated boys don't find work, and all this angers them.

As we said the Turkish case is not exactly the same. In the moderate Dyanet mosque in Breda elderly men rule the roost, though some younger Turks may visit, like the one we interviewed, who is also member of the *Bouwgroep*. The Turkish youngsters tend to go to organisations outside Breda, with more possibilities for youngsters, some as we already mentioned visit associations of movements that are less in the mainstream of Islam like the *Süleymançılar*, *Fetula Gülen* in Tilburg or *Milli Görüş* in Uden. Others find moderate Dyanet mosques that have more activities for youngsters, or stay at home. That means that the only place in Breda itself where Turkish youngsters, who are religious but who have a lot of questions, are really able to get more information on Islam is at the *Süleymançılar* organisation.

Their complex exists of two sections, firstly *Stichting Islamitische Centre*, the prayer hall and religious centre where questions on marriage, religion and social life as a Muslim in Holland can be asked, but also where educational activities take place. Characteristic for *Süleymançılar* is the focus on a spiritual attitude, that is the core of Islam, without getting lost in superficial rules. Secondly there is a the boarding school for girls since 1996, *Stichting Respect*, where girls in secondary school age can stay while they go to the regular secondary schools in Breda. The institute is not meant for problem cases; all girls stay voluntarily, and can go back home if they want to. A part of the upbringing is taken over from the parents, with a systematic Islamic basis. They are not allowed to hang out in the street; alcohol, smoking and sex is forbidden; the headscarf is the rule, and after school they are helped with homework and have some religious educational activities.

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<sup>15</sup> Generations change fast because of the young marriages among Moroccans.

The organisation gives both the girls who stay there and the visiting youngsters clear direction, and supports them actively. So this organisation is in its own way functioning as a safe guard against any fundamentalist tendencies that may exist among Turkish youngsters in Breda, by explaining very clear what their view on Islam is and what is unwanted. That this role is very important should not be underestimated in the current setting. The *Dyanet mosque* has not yet reached the stage to involve active youngsters, but we expect this to happen shortly.

We got the impression that the Turks in Breda are more aware of the different denominations within Islam than Moroccans. It does not easily occur that someone would visit the prayer in the *Süleymançılar* organisation, without knowing what kind of organisation this is. Probably the fact that denominations are normal in Turkey and something relatively new in the Moroccan monarchy where the king is the religious leader explains this. That's probably why the discussion in the Moroccan community on what is the real Islam is more necessary than in the Turkish community. But at the same time we see an increased interest of Turks in the Netherlands in more conservative movements like *Fetula Gülen* and *Milli Görüş*.

Besides issues of identity, finding the true Islam and prejudice, there are a few more practical issues that keep or have kept Muslims in Breda busy in the last years. We will shortly treat mosque building, Islamic burying and the Islamic primary school.

- Mosque building.

The Arrahman mosque was finished in 1999. We talked to a Moroccan representative who was at that time closely involved in the process of mosque building. He explained how the mosque came about. The first phase a few years earlier, was the gathering of money from the community, starting with 1000 guilders (454 euro) per family, but when that was not enough, more and more donations were asked from the community. A piece of land was bought behind the station with an old building on it.

Then an architect was approached, who was Dutch. The intention was to use a light color and to have one Moroccan square minaret, just like in Morocco. The idea was that the architect would do the necessary work for the permission, and that the Moroccans themselves would draw most of the plan. But this became much too expensive, since he didn't only ask payment for the design, but wanted 15% of the total building costs. In the end they negotiated the price down to 39.000. A lot was done by the Moroccans themselves, and the necessary maquette was made by students architecture, only what was really necessary was done by the architect. Requirements to get the building plan accepted were: the building has to fit in the surrounding, in terms of color and shape, the minaret could not be higher than 13 m., and of course there were requirements of safety, both during the building process and after. The interviewee explains proudly that he added the blocked tiles to the design, and that the minaret is actually slightly higher than 13 m.

Finally the building plan was approved after a very long process. The next phase was to get a building contractor. After the experience with the architect, this process was faster and more successful. They managed to find a good one and to make up a cheap contract immediately. When the building started, actually a lot of men helped with the technical work. It was really built by the whole community, and a very positive experience, since so many people enthusiastically joined with their expertise, one put the stucco work, another the tiles and a third one the electric system. In the end everyone was happy, everything paid, and there was even money left over, so immediately a larger space for the women was built.



Figure 5 The Arrahman Mosque Breda frontside (source: *De Stem*) (copyright?)

After the mosque was ready, a meeting was arranged for the neighbourhood. The neighbours had already made some trouble, but that soon disappeared after the mosque was opened. There was not really a parking place, but rather a lot of space on the streets around the mosque. One older lady asked not to park the mini vans that many Moroccans own in front of her house, and this kind of requests were met friendly and positive. Actually the neighbours became more curious and friendly after a short while, and at present (2009) they serve nearly every week information meetings and group excursions of all kinds of groups like Catholics, military and primary school kids, and they have regularly organised Iftars for the neighbours during Ramadan. The parking situation has not improved, since a school was opened on the next corner, and that causes a lot of parking problems.

- Islamic burial

As the Breda Newspaper *De Stem* of 21 May 2009 shows, a plan has been accepted very recently to increase the graveyard of Oudenbosch, near Breda, with a separate field with 230 graves directed towards Mekka, for Islamic burials. Nearby in Oosterhout there is also an area for 40 graves that will be reserved for Muslim burials when the extension of the graveyard is ready. For Breda itself we are not aware of such initiatives. This kind of initiatives are supported by *the Stichting Islamitische Begraafplaatsen West-Brabant*, (Foundation for Islamic Graveyards in Western Brabant) based in Bergen op Zoom.

- Islamic schools

Breda has one Islamic primary school, the *Okba Ibnoe Nafi School* (Archimedesstraat 2), which provides the regular curriculum, but from the viewpoint of an Islamic background. The schoolboard exists of representatives of both moderate and orthodox movements. As usual with schools with a religious basis, the general school inspection follows this school. Koran and Arabic lessons are not given in school but at the migrant associations.

Islamic schools are often the victim of extra media attention. The school had one extra investigation by the auditing service of the ministry of education in 2007, after an anonymous letter that certain procedures were not taking place according to the law. The auditing service concluded after its investigation that the accusations turned out completely false.

## 5.2 General approaches and policies towards Muslim groups

In the official policy of Breda, Muslims are not in any particularly way targeted. As a religious group they have the same rights as other religious communities, and as members of the Moroccan, Turkish and other ethnic groups they have the same rights as other disadvantaged communities. The mayor would just as well go to a celebration of Catholics as to a festival of Muslims or Jews. In practice the diversity coordinator is more closely involved with some of the Muslim organisations than for instance with the Jewish or Hindu groupings in Breda. This has to do with the size of the Moroccan and Turkish communities that are relatively large groups in Breda, with personal interest but probably also with the attention they get in the national debate.

## 5.3 Examples of concrete activities and measures improving the relations with Muslim groups

All measures that Breda takes to improve intergroup relations also apply to Muslims. But after 9/11 there have been some activities particularly directed towards Muslims, like the large *Iftar* in the Town hall in 2007. All relevant groupings were invited and the *Iftar* became a large event. Almost 200 people took part, including the Mayor and the aldermen and a number of high placed municipal employees. For the invitation the municipal and the *Ar Rahman mosque* cooperated and costs were shared. There are annual meetings between the Mayor plus some aldermen and the Islamic associations. And during *Ramadan* the Mayor and the aldermen visit the Muslim associations regularly on the occasion of the many *Iftars* that are being held. The alderwoman of Wellbeing participated in a congress about Islam in the Netherlands, commenting on the other speakers. That she used citations from the Koran in a positive way was for a social democrat a large step!

Simple things are done to improve relations. For instance during a visit at the accommodation of the *Stichting Islamitische Jongeren*, the mayor and alderman found out that there was no permit for public use. There might be a conflict with the safety rules. The municipal offered a safety check according to fire prevention rules and give advice without any cost on what had to be done to match with these regulations. After this advice the members of the association could implement all measures themselves and got the permit with the compliments of the fire brigade.

An initiative to improve relations with Muslims was the municipal initiative to solve the problems during the *Eid-el Korban* (Muslim slaughter feast). There were not enough places where the animals to be sacrificed could be slaughtered in a religious way. The municipal could finally convince one of the bigger slaughter houses to open their doors to Muslims.

Initiatives to create more understanding between Muslims and others are actively supported, like for instance a weekend that was organised by a (rather orthodox) Islamic women's group, who invited non-Muslim women to learn more about each other. A young Muslim lady was supported to organise a debate in the local central library.

As we described in 4.3 the initiatives of the church has been fairly important with its *Interreligious Workgroup*, starting from the discussion meeting 'Islam, curse or blessing?', and proceeding with several other meetings like the church service where the Turkish imam read the Koran and the quiz made by Moroccan girls about the resemblance between Islam and Christianity.

The municipal actively commemorates *Kristallnacht*. The mayor and/or aldermen participate in the programme, of course with representatives from the Jewish community but as well from the Muslim community. Most of the costs of this event are covered by the municipality.

The social work office was asked to get involved in organising a demonstration against the Israeli invasion in Gaza early 2009. This was an initiative by Moroccan Muslims, who asked support because they thought it was necessary to involve authorities because of the safety. The director of the Social Work office advised to broaden the target group, and ask among others the Jewish organisation also, so that it wouldn't become a Muslim only demonstration. In the end it became more people joined that just Moroccans, and the extreme right didn't organise a counter demonstration. It all went ahead peacefully.

The Catholic *Jeruzalem Parish* in *Breda Noord* also arranged things, like the *Vredesweek* (Week of Peace) in 20–28 September 2008<sup>16</sup>. In the program, opened by the alderman of social affairs, a lot of attention was paid to bringing immigrant religious groupings together, dialogue between religious groupings and peace in countries of origin (one evening particularly on Congo). And a workgroup came about that will establish a peace monument in Breda. The activities were so extensive that one elderly Moroccan lady remarked “nowadays I spend more time in the church than in the mosque”.

Just after the murder on Theo van Gogh in 2004 all neighbourhood councils were gathered, to talk about and follow social developments in the neighbourhoods. At that time also the Social Work office *Vertizontaal*, particularly the youth workers have been active in organising discussion meetings for youngsters. A meeting place for Muslim girls was set up; there was support for sport and other social activities; and there have been several projects to support youngsters at school and to find work. In 2005–2006 an Islamic sport club for ladies was subsidized. This was a group of strict Muslim women who wanted aerobics without music. Though there were other sport activities in the neighbourhood, it was supported because Breda thought it could prevent social isolation. As Zannoni e.o. (2006:60) notice, the attention for Muslims diminished in 2006, but the good point is that contacts have been established.

#### **5.4 Public communication**

As we have shown earlier, Breda tends to promote itself as a relaxed and easygoing place, where conflicts don't easily escalate. There is no structural attention to prejudice against immigrants or against Muslims in the policy, nor in the way the authorities deal with the media. Generally the policy is to soften anything that could escalate, ‘dempen’, as the security coordinator calls it. An example shows how a tense situation was handled, when the right wing politician Geert Wilders made his movie ‘*Fitna*’ available on the internet. Immediately after the movie came out, the mayor told the crisis manager – an officer that works at the City Hall but directly connected with the police to coordinate any crisis that may arise – and the director of the social work office to gather all the involved parties, including police and representatives of Muslim associations. All came at very short notice and worked together constructively. Imams urged for calmness, and as the involved explain, the solidarity was striking. In the end nothing really happened.

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<sup>16</sup> <http://www.parochiebredanoord.nl/vredesweek%20Programma%202008.doc> –

A similar strategy was followed with a fire incident in the mosque, just after the murder on Theo van Gogh. On 7 November 2004, someone put isolation material behind the *Arrahman Mosque* on fire. The fire was stopped and didn't reach the mosque. In the same week there were 11 cases of arson in Islamic buildings in the Netherlands, including a school that completely burned down, and this went on for the next two weeks (NRC, 24 November 2004 <sup>17</sup>) Though there were suspicions of anti-Muslim intentions, the mosque representatives reacted calm, 'nothing actually happened, just a bunch of isolation material, and let's now first find out who has done this'. The next day it turned out that a 14 year old boy from the neighbourhood had caused the fire. He was called to the mosque and explained how dangerous it could have been when the building would have caught fire, and that was it. In the next weeks the mosque board received several threats (Zannoni e.a. 2006). The board asked the support of the police, and a better cooperation developed between police and Muslims. Though fear in the Moroccan community increased, the board repeated it's request to remain calm. The public communication strategy of the municipal in this case was mainly reactive. Things happened behind the scenes: a meeting of the relevant individuals (security managers, Muslim representatives, social work representatives and others) was held before the movie film came out, foreseeing that this could become explosive, and appointments were made to give out a calming message. At the same time extra police patrol took place to protect potential targets.

A rather special provision for religious groups in the Netherlands exists on the national TV. As an outflow from the pillarised system of the past century, a national Muslim Broadcasting Association, the '*Nederlandse Moslim Omroep*' (NMO) exists. We talked to the chairperson of the board of the NMO. The three central goals of the Muslim Broadcasting Organisation NMO are:

- a) Making the unity and diversity within Islam in the Netherlands visible and promoting mutual recognition and tolerance among adherents of Islam, passing the borders of the confessional groups and ethnic backgrounds that are represented in the Netherlands
- b) Muslims in the Netherlands live in socially backward circumstances. The negative image of Islam makes this worst and can cause a structural backward position of the group and segregation. The NMO wants to fight this stereotype of the enemy and by this and to integration equal treatment of Islamic groups and the improvement of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in Dutch society.
- c) NMO chooses to support the improved social position of Islamic youngsters, women and elderly, by recognising that these groups are not only vulnerable in society as a whole but also within Islamic circles and that they deserve support.

Though this is not particular for Breda, provisions like this help immigrants to feel that they and their religion are accepted.

## 5.5 Summary and lessons learnt

On the one hand the Netherlands and Breda have all kinds of provisions for Muslims like Islamic schools, the possibility to build mosques, graveyards and even a broadcasting organisation on the national TV. These

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[http://www.nrc.nl/dossiers/moslimterreur/maatschappelijke\\_onrust\\_reactie/article1605967.ece/Incident\\_en\\_sinds\\_2\\_november](http://www.nrc.nl/dossiers/moslimterreur/maatschappelijke_onrust_reactie/article1605967.ece/Incident_en_sinds_2_november)

provisions are meant to give equal rights to all religious groupings, and Muslims can more easily feel accepted because of this. These issues are well arranged in Breda, in cooperation with the municipal.

On the other hand, there are issues that the Muslim community finds important, and that are only to a limited extent picked up by the administration. The issue of prejudice towards and the acceptance of Islam in the Netherlands is one of them. A second issue is the discrimination on the labour market of high educated boys from the second generation. With the desire to move up to the middle class, and not to remain in the dirty jobs of their parents, they find it very frustrating to be refused in application procedures because of their background. The third issue is the search for a positive identity as a Muslim in Dutch society. With all the prejudice about Islam, it is extremely difficult for youngsters to proudly say I am a Muslim. Particularly youngsters feel not supported at all by Dutch authorities, and as one of the representatives of the Muslim organisations that we interviewed explained, this is a time bomb. A local or a national administration can of course not interfere with religious discussions, but they could think of supporting institutions that help youngsters in their search. There are many examples we can think of like opening a library with religious literature, asking well know Egyptian speakers to lecture on Islam, organising discussion where youngsters can see the standpoints of the Islamic denominations, making moderate Islamic institutions stronger and thereby taking care that there is no need to go to extreme ones, etceteras. This could be useful additions to the policy, not only because some of them may otherwise end up in the hands of fundamentalist movements, but more so to avoid further polarisation between Muslims and non Muslims.

## 6 Intergroup relations and radicalisation

After 9/11/2001 the national *Instituut voor Veiligheids en Crisismanagement* (COT, Institute for Safety and Crisis Management) was established and started to investigate the situation in Dutch cities. Reports were published on many Dutch cities. In 2005/2006 Zannoni, Naaijken & Schaap (2006) of COT studied polarisation and radicalisation in the police district Breda which consists of Breda plus six surrounding smaller municipalities. The report distinguishes polarisation and radicalisation. Polarisation is the sharpening of contradictions between groups in society which result are can result in an increase of tensions between these groups, and in risk for social security (Zannoni et. al. 2006:12). Radicalisation is the active intend or support of drastic changes in society, that can result in a danger for the existence of a democratic legal order (goal), possibly by the use of undemocratic methods (mean), that can result in disfunctioning of the democratic legal order (effect) (Zannoni a.o. 2006:20). Polarisation can but doesn't automatically lead to radicalisation.

The dynamics that we described in chapter 5 from the point of view of Muslims shows that polarisation is to a certain degree taking place, though not everyone talks about it openly. Also on the side of the autochthonous there are frustrations about the Dutch 'multicultural' society. Already for more than fifteen years about half of them think that there are too many 'allochtonous' in the Netherlands and since 2000 a similar percentage thinks that a Western way of living doesn't match with a Muslim way of living (Zannoni et. al. 2006:15–16). The views that anti-immigrant politicians like Wilders express on national TV, legitimate the expression of anti-immigrant views on the street, and consequently negative behaviour is becoming more obvious. This forms a breeding ground for polarisation.

Zannoni and others show that the step from polarisation to radicalisation has not really been taken in the case of Muslims in these six municipalities, but the step towards right wing radicalisation was more clear, and particularly observed in the smaller municipalities around Breda. They call it latent right wing extremism. Since Breda is the entertainment centre for these villages, these individuals and groups also turn up in Breda.

As a consequence of the attention for polarisation and radicalisation on national level, Breda has given the already existing safety coordinator, a police officer residing in the mayor's office, the extra task to function as a central coordination point for polarisation and radicalisation. This means in practice that he gets briefed, and acts in the case of incidents. After the report came out, the social work office– together with *Buro Radar* Rotterdam – organised a course for teachers, police officers, social workers and officials on recognising signals of polarisation and what to do about it. Because more right wing polarisation was noticed than Muslim radicalisation, the focus was on right wing radicalisation. The ministry didn't provide extra money, because the level of radicalisation that the researchers found, was considered mild.

### 6.1 Radicalisation within the majority population

Zannoni a.o. (2006: 58, 73–74) describe how fights and incidents between white and immigrant groups occur with a certain regularity in the night life district of Breda, on the football fields and at the schools. Some fights start because of minor reasons, but friends are called and it turns into a more intense fight with



racist motives (foreigners have to get out, etceteras). There are also stories of intentional mobbing of white youth looking for Moroccans or Antilleans and the reverse.

The main organising principle is a youth culture, which exists for unclear reasons fairly present in Brabant and which consists of white boys and girls only, who wear clothes of the brand *Lonsdale* (and therefore called *Lonsdale* youngsters or *Lonsdalers*), who use extreme right symbols like swastika's and white power signs, who like hardcore music, and who openly intend to show that they have negative feelings about foreigners. Individuals and groups are seen in Breda and in the villages around Breda. The groups don't originate from Breda's ethnically mixed neighbourhoods, where Dutch and immigrants know each other better, but from white areas and villages. Some schools in Breda have forbidden the *Lonsdale* dress and try to discuss this ideology. According to Zannoni et al. (2006:74) extreme right political ideas, if completely developed, don't lead to behaviour to undermine the rule of law, so they cannot be considered a real political or neo-Nazi extreme right group, but it's clear that their common ground is that they are against foreigners, and sometimes come together to beat them up.

Not all individuals that express themselves with anti-immigrant statements and symbols are part of an organised group or of the *Lonsdale* youth culture. Even the guys wearing *Lonsdale* clothing aren't stably or hierarchically organised, though there is some network, and concerts where they meet. There are also individuals that express extreme right sympathies, and use extreme right symbols. Part of the problem is that youngsters repeat what their parents have been saying all their lives (anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish views), but that youngsters can in the current social setting in the Netherlands, more easily show this openly. Twenty years ago there general consensus that swastika's were not acceptable, but currently there is hidden or openly more support for this kind of views.

The number of times that radical right wing symbols were used and xenophobic, discriminating and racist expressions were written on walls in Breda has been counted by the police in 2005, they counted 10 graffiti messages (swastika, white power, foreigners out, etceteras). Some of the more extreme resentment against immigrants – especially Muslims – is expressed on the internet on web pages like *Polinco*, *Stormfront* and *Holland Hardcore*, according to Van Donselaar & Rodriguez (2006). These are national webpages, but the above groups are possible visitors.

As we already mentioned in chapter 5.4, there have been 'revenge' incidents of white Dutch individuals towards Muslim after the murder on Theo van Gogh, with a more or less clear xenophobic and nationalist background, like a fire incident in the mosque, the threats to the mosque board and the Islamic school.

Resentment towards immigrants becomes also to some extent manifest in voting at the elections: 5.6 % of voters in Breda voted during the 2006 national elections for the right wing party of Wilders '*Partij voor de Vrijheid*' (PVV), the same as the national average of 5.6% (source: website Breda). The percentage of Wilders voters has increased in 2009 to 16% at the European elections (17% nationally). The percentage in Breda doesn't differ a lot from the adjacent municipal Zundert (20%) where *Lonsdale* youngsters are a visibly category, so the difference between Breda and Zundert is not that big. Of course voting is a democratic form of expressing views, but that it can add to the polarisation between groups is clear.

## 6.2 Radicalisation within the migrant and/or minority population

As Zannoni a.o. (2006) have shown, there is not sign of actual radicalisation among Muslim youngsters. The representative of the *Stichting Islamitische Jongeren* agrees with this statement as far as it concerns Moroccans. He remarks that there are certain Dutch converts about whom he is not sure. Another risk group according to a national report are Somali's, who are not in contact with the organisations. Both the *Stichting Islamitische Jongeren* and the *Arrahman Mosque* are well aware of the danger of radicalisation, and consciously pushing youngsters in the 'right' direction. They also communicate with each other in the case that a travelling stranger shows up who tries to spread pamphlets that they don't like. To spread pamphlets in the *Arrahman Mosque* they need to get an approval stamp by the mosque board. The one case that was noticed of a travelling preacher in 2005, was immediately reported to the *Stichting Islamitische Jongeren* to avoid that this person would get the chance with them.

The two orthodox Islamic organisations in Breda were both studied by the national intelligence (AIVD) and described as extreme. *Stichting Islamitische Jongeren* was accused of financial connection with the Wahabi movement *Al Waqf Al Islamia* in the *Al Fourkan mosque* in Eindhoven<sup>18</sup>. The *Stichting* protested and declared publicly that they have no ties whatsoever and also don't agree with the political and religious ideas of *Al Waqf*. Also the Turkish Süleymançılar organisation was described as extremist. The Süleymançı's managed to have this corrected on national TV, they explained that they are an orthodox Islamic organisation, interested in serious religious piety, but that this has nothing to do with the political goals of fundamentalist movements. In the last ten years they tend to take unrecognisable names for their organisations, to avoid media attention. Outsiders are not immediately aware of the connections. For the general public it is difficult to distinguish the difference between orthodox religious views – that also exist among Dutch and are no problem within the law – and political extremism based on Islamist views that are ready to use violence to change society. The outsider just notices that a boy starts to wear a beard, wears jellaba and cites a lot from the Koran, but that to what extent this is just orthodoxy or political extremism is not directly visible.

It is striking that the two more orthodox Muslim religious organisations in Breda have been the first to become active in guiding youngsters that go lost in their search to become a good Muslim. The moderate *Arrahman Mosque* has followed rather fast, but the *Dyanet Mosque* still needs to get activated in this field.

## 6.3 Communication strategy concerning radicalisation

Breda avoids the term radicalisation in all its communication. Radicalisation is according to the representative of the Diversity department a heavy concept that doesn't cover the reality in Breda. To use that concept for Muslims would actually make things worse, because it is easily taken as an insult by

<sup>18</sup> The imam was accused of recruiting soldiers for Al Queda. See:

[http://www.nrc.nl/dossiers/moslimterreur/radicale\\_imams\\_moskeen\\_etc/article1628854.ece/OM\\_moskee\\_Eindhoven\\_werft\\_strijders](http://www.nrc.nl/dossiers/moslimterreur/radicale_imams_moskeen_etc/article1628854.ece/OM_moskee_Eindhoven_werft_strijders)

Muslims. Actual radicalisation does either not or to a very limited extend exist, is the view, and the national attention for it is considered a hype.

Right wing radicalisation – the *Lonsdale* groups – it is mainly something that the youth work tries to cope with, without making it a public issue. Youth workers have for instance within a project called *Samen er Tegenaan* (SET – Together we go for it), gathered a group of *Lonsdalers* that were causing some trouble in the (white) *Ginneken* neighbourhood, provided them with information about Moroccan culture, and organised a meeting with Moroccan youngsters. This is supposed to have resulted in more moderate ideas among these youngsters about Moroccans (Zannoni e.o. 2006: 74).

#### **6.4 Radicalisation: Summary and lessons learnt**

There are a few lessons that we can learn from Breda in this subject. The first one is that the network of migrant associations, youth workers and police is still big enough and effective to stop excrescences to further develop. That Muslim radicalisation is halted, is mainly due to the Muslim associations, that have taken an active approach, and that manage to convince youngsters to join them and to discuss the right path, the acceptable and the unacceptable. The orthodox associations have actually become more open and cooperative since they have this role. The municipal can further stimulate associations that are not yet active in supporting youngsters and searching individuals, particularly the Turkish *Dyanet mosque*<sup>19</sup>, the Indonesian Muslim associations and maybe contact could be established with the Somali community. Of course this cannot pass the level that the municipal interferes in religious affairs, but convincing them that some attention for this issue is needed seems usefull.

Another lesson is that the approach of youth office towards right wing radicals was successful. This could be extended, in cooperation with police and schools. Creating contact between white boys and girls and Muslims, taking care that teachers can cope with tensions in classrooms and can talk about it, organising excursions to the mosque, and intervening when it comes to violence. Including the youngsters of the junior P-team (see 4.1) and mosques could be interesting.

A third lesson is that it's better not to hide reality: if there are racist incidents, one needs to address this. If the administration wants to stop racist incidents either directed to Moroccans or to *Lonsdalers*, it has to send out a clear message that certain behaviour is not acceptable.

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<sup>19</sup> Requests of the municipality to the *Dyanet mosque* to participate in meetings are usually answered by sending a big plate of cookies.

## 7 Conclusion: Key challenges, lessons and learning for CLIP

In this report we have treated Breda's policies on inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue, with special attention for Muslim associations and radicalisation. As we have seen in chapter 4 associations of immigrants are traditionally supported in Breda, including religious associations. This has led to a network of immigrant associations that form an active civic community, and that the municipal can depend on and call in case of crisis. This is true for both cultural and religious associations. The lines are short due to the small size of Breda and the easygoing attitudes. The relations with the Moroccan mosque became stronger after a fire incident and threats to the mosque, but the result is that cooperation is now open and direct.

We have shown how a new method of involving citizens in the policy, the method of '*Appreciative inquiry*' was put into practice after complaints that the administration was a white bulwark. Wandering to what extent this kind of system could work in other cities, one of the members of the *Bouwgroep* formulated some preconditions for success of this kind of system. Firstly some active citizens are needed, that feel the need to co-decide, if everyone is satisfied, no one will step up to interfere. Secondly officials and aldermen have to be open for bottom-up initiatives and hire experts to support the process. Thirdly they have to be open to an ideology that supports categorical initiatives (specific policies for specific groups), and not convinced that improving general services is the ideal. Fourthly one has to find suitable members (in this case a kernel of 11-12 and about 25-26 more loosely connected individuals from different ethnic groups new each other). Fifthly a strong feeling of communality is required within that group. And sixthly, one has to be aware that stamina and resilience is required from the officials. The main target of the *Bouwgroep* is that diversity policy is in the end something obvious and not separately needed anymore and it will then abolish itself.

In chapter 5 we went on investigating the particular issues of Muslims in Breda. To our surprise an issue came up in the interviews that was not at all mentioned in the bottom up process of *Appreciative Inquiry*, even though Muslim associations participated in that procedure. A very important concern of Muslims in Breda, is anti-Muslim prejudice, the search of youngsters for a positive identity: how to become a good Muslim in the Dutch context, and the role that religious associations play or should play to give these searching youngsters direction and to avoid that they go to extremist Islamic views. We have seen how Muslim associations are indispensable in the anti radicalisation field, and that the two more conservative movements actually took the lead, followed by the Moroccan mosque. The organisations are dealing with these issues rather independently, without a lot of support from the authorities.

We can only guess why these important issues did not become an item in the bottom up process of policy development. Though the municipal states that no steering took place, maybe socio-economic issues were received by officials as 'real policy issues that we can work on' (the labour market aspect is on the list) or maybe the Muslim associations thought that the municipal cannot involve in religious issues. A fact is that the subject is actually most relevant and to our opinion needs attention.

Looking at intergroup relations and anti-radicalisation in chapter 6, a very limited number of policies were developed in this field, since the view was dominant that radicalisation is a too heavy word for what is happening in Breda and since the actual number of radicals was very limited. It became quit clear though

that the breeding ground for polarisation is present in Breda and surrounding. On the one hand there are the frustrations of Muslim youngsters who are disturbed by the negative expressions about their religion and ethnic group. On the other hand there are *Lonsdale* groups, who openly express anti immigrant views, using extreme right wing symbols. Even though not all members of these groups have the extreme right goal of changing society and turn this into anti-democratic behaviour, anti-integrative tendencies are clear and as was shown when the swastika was painted on a Carnival wagon in Zundert the surrounding doesn't protest, finds it even funny and thereby (silently) agrees with the message. As Zannoni and colleagues (2006:110) write in their recommendation, the municipal has to give a clear message what is acceptable and what not. Consequently correcting norm breaking behaviour will work preventive to stop further polarisation. Cooperation with schools is important. That the mosque is weekly flooded by interested tour groups is a positive sign. More attention of the policy makers for the breeding ground for polarisation could help Breda to fill in objective number 1 formulated in the document *Maatschappelijke Visie 2006-2010*, to remain a nice place to stay for all (goed toeven).

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## 9 Interview partners

1. Ria Bolink, official responsible for the diversity policy of the Municipal Breda and CLIP contact person.
2. Jan Klerx, region manager of Surplus Welzijn, one of the two big social work institutions in Breda
3. Henk Boelen, Safety Director for the municipal Breda (coordinating the work of municipal with the police, with attention for radicalisation and polarisation)
4. Luis Simoes, member of the 'Bouwgroep' that takes part in the cities process to write a policy paper on Diversity, and representative of Oneness Africa
5. Osman Erbas, member of the 'Bouwgroep' that takes part in the cities process to write a policy paper on Diversity, and involved with the Turkish community in Breda
6. Hassan Kaya, Turkish representative of 'Stichting Islamitische Centrum Breda' en 'Stichting Respect' (boarding school on religious basis for girls)
7. Driss Siraji, representative of the 'Werkgroep Marokkanen', has been involved in the building process of Arrahman Mosque, and is also part of the 'Bouwgroep'
8. Agdel Kadi Ouahabi, board member of the Arrahman Mosque.
9. Abdelmajid Boudzra, chairman of the Moroccan 'Stichting Islamitische Jongeren', treasurer of the Islamic Primary School and secretary of the Moroccan Platform
10. Reverent ds. Piet Warmerhoven of the protestant church in Breda, and member of the interreligious workgroup in Breda
11. Aissa Zanzen, Chairperson of the board of the Muslim Broadcasting Organisations NMO
12. Marcel Maussen, Researcher on Mosque building and author of "Space for Islam" , Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, University of Amsterdam
13. Visited a lecture by Marieke Sloom and Jean Tillie of the University of Amsterdam on processes of radicalisation and de-radicalisation.



## Appendix List of Associations of Immigrants

Active?	Name	Address
	<b>Surinamese</b>	
x	Dosti–Armaan–AUM Pracharak Sabha Breda/VHM Breda	Heksenwiellaan 181
x	Vishwa–Hindoe Mandier Breda	Graaf Hendrik III Plein 28.
	Paramu (Breda) (not in Chamber of Commerce)	Eksterstraat 42
	Stichting Akantroesoe (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Weilustlaan 249
	Stichting Wi Makandra (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Philips Lammekensstraat 30
	Stichting Hindoeisme (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Bernard de Wildestraat 544
	Stichting Winston 2000 (or new name: Institute Win voor Multiculturele Ontwikkeling, not specific for Surinamese) (not in Chamber of Commerce)	Pelmolenstraat 5/a
	<b>Antilleans</b>	
x	Stichting Sentro Pa Antiyano I Arubano Breda S.A.A.B.	J F Kennedylaan 36
	<b>Moroccans</b>	
x	Stichting Islamitisch Primair Onderwijs	Antiloostraat 51
x	Stichting voor Islamitische Jongeren in Breda	Antiloostraat 51
x	Stichting Islamitische Marokkaanse Moskee Rahman	Archimedesstraat 6
x	Stichting Nederlandse Federatie van Maghrebijnse Islamitische Organisaties (NFMIO)	Waterloostraat 17
x	Stichting Marokkaans Vrouwen Comité	v. Limburg Stirumstraat 3
x	Stichting Platform Marokkanen Breda	Pieter Huysersstraat 7
	Stichting Marokkanen Breda (not in Chamber of Commerce)	J F Kennedylaan 36
	Infopunt Islam (not in Chamber of Commerce)	J F Kennedylaan 36
	Stichting Maghreb Promotion (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Ganzerik 60
	Stichting Marokkaanse Jongeren Breda (not in Chamber of Commerce)	Jacob Romanstraat 58
x	Stichting Turks/Marokkaans Jongerencentrum	Van Coothplein 41
	<b>Turks</b>	
x	Islamitische Stichting Nederland (Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi), Yeni Breda	Bouwerijstraat 8
x	Turks–Islamitische Culturele Jongerenvereniging Breda (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Brouwerijstraat 8
	Turk Islam Kultur Komisyonu (not in Chamber of Commerce)	Brouwerijstraat 8
x	Stichting Islam Cultuur in Nederland (ICN)	Dammestraat 16
x	Stg Islamitisch Centrum Breda (Suleymancilar)	Oosterhoutseweg 3
x	Stichting Respect (Suleymancilar)	Oosterhoutseweg 3
x	Stichting Turken Breda (S.T.B.)	J F Kennedylaan 36

x	Turks-Nederlands Vriendschapsvereniging	Loevensteinlaan 189
	Turks Cultureel Centrum (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Postbus 3182
	Hilal Turks Culturele Jongerenvereniging (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Postbus 3182
	Stichting Turks Cultureel Centrum Bergen op Zoom (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Postbus 3182
	Turks Cultureel Jongeren Centrum (adres Surplus Welzijn, not in Chamber of Commerce)	Nieuwe Ginnekenstraat 18
	Turkse Jongeren (stopped, not in Chamber of Commerce)	Ceresstraat 29
	Turks Vrouwenkomitee (not in Chamber of Commerce)	Marialaan 11 A
	Stichting Turks Centrum Breda en omgeving (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Sophiastraat 3 A
	Stichting Turkse Jongeren Gilze en Rijen (not in Chamber of Commerce)	Baronielaan 309
	T.S.P. (Turkse Studenten Vereniging Prisma) (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Hogeschoollaan 1
	Turkse Culturele Stichting Anatolië (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Grote Doornbos 34
	Bredase Turkse Culturele Vereniging (address Surplus Welzijn, not in Chamber of Commerce)	Nieuwe Ginnekenstraat 18
	Turkse Gemeenschap (not in Chamber of Commerce)	Dagpauwoog 15
	<b>Moluccans</b>	
x	Persatuan Pemuda Muslim se-Eropa wilayah Breda Ar-Rahman (Vereniging van Islamitische Jongeren in Europa regio Breda Ar-Rahman)	Luxemburglaan 229
x	Pasar Malam Maluku	Weegbladtuin 3
x	Stg Wijkraad Maluku Breda	Wieringenstraat 37
	Oecumenische Christelijke Samenkomst Indonesië Nederland	Weegbladtuin 3
x	Geredja Injili Maluku (GIM): Molukse Evangelische Kerk. (1e user of church building Immanuel)	Terschellingstraat 4
x	Geredja Protestant Maluku di Belanda (GPMB): Molukse Protestantse Kerk in Nederland (2nd user church building Immanuel)	Terschellingstraat 4
x	Geredja Protestant Maluku di Belanda Maart 1953 (GPMB MAART 53): Molukse Protestantse Kerk in Nederland Maart 1953. (3rd user churchbuilding Immanuel)	Terschellingstraat 4
x	Stichting Ondersteuning Stuurgroep Molukse Ouderen	Kroondreef 42
	St. Fonds Pemuda Maluku (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Molenleystraat 25 A
	Stichting Werkgelegenheid en Educatie Molukkers Noord-Brabant (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Concordiastraat 6 A
	F.C.M. (Football Club Molukken) (in Chamber of Commerce but	Wieringenstraat 17

	stopped)	
	Bestuur "Angkatan-Muda" Noodgemeente Geredja Protestant Maluku di Belanda (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Terschellingstraat 20
?	Kulit Kenari (not in Chamber of Commerce)	Wieringenstraat 1
?	Kumpulan Hena Poput (not in Chamber of Commerce)	p/a Wieringenstraat 35
?	Kumpulan Titawaai (niet in KvK)	Terschellingstraat 4
x	Stichting Woonzorgcentrum Raffy	Bernard de Wildestraat 400
	Stg. Toma (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Wieringenstraat 60/ Postbus 3182
	Chinese	
?	Kerkgenootschap CEME Breda	P/a Speelhuislaan 6
?	Breda Lutherse Jeugd Club voor Chinezen	?
?	Chinese school in Breda (ACV)	Jan Nieuwenhuyzenstraat 2
x	Sectie Chinees van de Vereniging voor Leraren in Levende Talen	Viandenlaan 23
	Other	
x	Stichting Oneness Africa	Christiaan Huygensstraat 44
x	Stichting Afro Brabant	Roeselarestreet 76
x	Stichting Africa Sport	Fazantstraat 8
x	Stichting African(s) Rights International Foundation	Vierbunder 14
x	Stichting Save Ethiopian Children (SEC)	Gasthuisstraat 38
x	Stichting Somalische Cultuur Nederland	Westmallestraat 16
	Stichting Hulp voor Dakloze Kinderen in Bosnie-Herzegovina (not in Chamber of Commerce)	Postbus 3182
x	Vereniging Bosniers en Vrienden van Bosnie en Hercegovina	Hooilaan 101
x	Cambodjaanse Vereniging in Nederland	Heusdenhoutsestraat 20 /4
	Stichting Somalisch Rehabilitatieprogramma (not in Chamber of Commerce)	Wensel Cobergherstraat 157
	Stichting Missieluchtvaart Dunggu-Republique Du Zaire (not in Chamber of Commerce)	Vijverstraat 12
	Les Messagers (Eglise Kongolais) (not in Chamber of Commerce)	Dreef 5
x	De Stem van Soedan	Kasterleestraat 244
	Stichting ter Behartiging van het Grieks Orthodoxe Leven (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Kloosterlaan 6
x	Centro Espanol de Breda (Spaans Centrum Breda)	J F Kennedylaan 36
	Spaanse Ouders- en Leerlingenvereniging (Asociacion de Padres de Alumnos de Breda) (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Postbus 3182
	Vereniging voor Spaanse Vrouwen (in Chamber of Commerce but	Postbus 3182

	stopped)	
	St Hulp aan Poolse Kinderopvangtehuizen (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Jacob Catssingel 19
x	Stichting Poolse School Breda	Jacob Catssingel 65
	Poolse Folkloristische Dans en Zangensempel KARPACZ (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Tweede Marktstraat 6 –17
	Poolse Katholieke Vereniging in Nederland (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Seelingsingel 9
x	Stichting Poolse Vriendschapsbanden Moerdijk	Louwersdonk 37
x	Vereniging 1e Poolse Pantserdivisie Nederland	Biezenstraat 5
	Internationale Vereniging tot Behartiging van Belangen van Zigeuners Pasetartout International Romano (in Chamber of Commerce but stopped)	Haagweg 270
	Boeddhisme van Nichiren en SGI Breda, Baronie/West-Brabant	Zandhovenstraat 14
	Bahai groep Breda	<a href="mailto:breda@bahai.nl">breda@bahai.nl</a>
	Vereniging Vrienden van de Synagoge Breda	Schoolstraat

Source: Handelsregister Kamer van Koophandel (Chamber of Commerce).

Note: according to the CLIP contact person there are also Russian, Polish, Sierra Leonean, Iraqi and Nigerian associations, but we have no names and addresses, and we couldn't find them in the Chamber of Commerce.